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Christian theology maintains a holistic-dualistic vision of the human person and destiny. 
It asserts that the human person is the unity of a spiritual soul and a physical body. The soul 
survives bodily death and, in the intermediate state, “waits” for a reunion with the resurrected 
body. Belief in the immortality of the soul has been expressed in many doctrinal documents and 
liturgical texts of the Church. It has also penetrated practices of many Christians, particularly in 
their relations to the deceased.  
Developments in biblical studies and advances in natural sciences in the last century, 
however, have led theologians to raise questions about the immortality of the soul. In the 
twentieth century, several theologians such as C. Stange, A. Schaller, P. Althaus, G. Greshake, 
and G. Lohfink emphasized the indissoluble unity of the human person, in life and death. They 
also suggested that bodily resurrection is the authentic biblical hope. Soul-body dualism and the 
immortality of the soul were considered Platonic philosophy, not original biblical teachings. 
Challenge to the immortality of the soul on biblical ground reached a high point with O. 
Cullmann’s Ingersoll lecture in 1955 and a booklet published a couple of years later. Debate over 
dualism versus monism, the immortality of the soul versus resurrection of the body, attracted 
significant attention and reaction from both ordinary and learned Christians in the 1960s and 
1970s, before it cooled down in continental Europe.  
On the threshold of the twenty-first century, some nonreductive physicalist theologians in 
North America, such as Nancey Murphy or Joel Green, also raised questions about the Christian 
concepts of soul and the soul’s immortality. The charge this time is not limited to the Hellenistic 






evolution biology, and neuroscience, physicalist theologians reject the existence of a 
metaphysical element called “soul” in theological anthropology. For them, even the concept of 
soul, once considered necessary to account for distinctive human capacities, is no longer helpful. 
Indeed, the capacities once attributed to the soul, such as freedom, moral responsibility, and 
spirituality, can be allegedly explained by the functions of the brain, in interaction with socio-
cultural and historical factors. From those arguments, physicalists like Murphy suggest an 
abandonment of the concept of soul and the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, to support the 
body and bodily resurrection as authentic biblical and Christian teachings about the human 
person and human destiny. 
The physicalists’ suggestion, claimed to be biblically and scientifically sound, poses a 
significant challenge to traditional Christian anthropology and eschatology. It has caused not 
only a debate amongst theologians but also uncertainty and confusion amongst ordinary 
Christians, I myself included. But uncertainty and confusion can be starting points for a query 
into the doctrine, and a number of questions can be asked: What is precisely the “soul” in the 
teaching of the Christian Church? What is meant by the immortality of the soul? Is the Church’s 
teaching about the soul’s immortality firmly founded on the Scripture, or is it a Hellenistic 
philosophical belief? Is it true that the concepts of soul and the immortality of the soul are no 
longer helpful for a Christian understanding of the human person and destiny? To answer those 
questions systematically and coherently, it seems necessary to have a thorough investigation into 
the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, especially its biblical foundation and its theological 
unfolding in our contemporary context. 
This thesis is an attempt to investigate the doctrine, and to answer the above questions in 






magisterial documents, to see how the immortality of the soul has been understood along 
Christian tradition. I will also consider challenges that face the doctrine, particularly from 
nonreductive physicalism, endorsed by Nancey Murphy and others physicalist theologians. In the 
second chapter, I will delve into contemporary biblical criticism, especially the studies of 
scholars who have engaged in the discussions of the soul and immortality. Their researches and 
discoveries will help us see whether the doctrine in question is firmly founded on the Scripture, 
or that it is merely a Greek belief inserted into some biblical texts and mistakenly accepted as 
original biblical teaching. In the last chapter, I will turn to Joseph Ratzinger and Karl Rahner’s 
thoughts of the doctrine. Their insights, hopefully, will shed further light on our discussion of the 







CHAPTER I:  
THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL:  
TRADITIONAL DOCTRINE AND CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 
 
This chapter focuses on the current state of our subject matter – the immortality of the 
human soul. On the one hand, the immortality of the soul had been part of the Catholic 
understanding of faith for centuries, before it was officially defined as a doctrine at the Fifth 
Lateran Council in 1513. The doctrine is supposedly supported by the Scripture and tradition, 
and its binding force is emphasized in certain documents of the Catholic Church. On the other 
hand, that doctrine has been challenged, not only by some Protestant and Catholic theologians 
more than half a century ago, but also by contemporary physicalist theologians, on the basis of 
biblical criticism, history of doctrine, and modern sciences. As arguments against the soul and 
the immortality of the soul spread, ordinary Christians may feel confused about the continued 
life of the departed. They may even doubt the authenticity and validity of the traditional teaching 
about the issue.  
In this context, I want to look closely at the doctrine of the immortality of the soul as well 
as challenges facing it. Thus, I will first explore the Catholic teaching about the soul, how the 
immortality of the soul was affirmed as a doctrine in the Middle Ages, and how that doctrine has 
been maintained by the magisterium until the end of the twentieth century. Next, I will turn to 
contemporary challenges to that doctrine. I will analyze particularly the nonreductive 
physicalism put forth by Nancey Murphy – one of the most notable proponents of physicalism. 
Once those positions are examined, we can see with some clarity questions facing the Catholic 






I. Traditional Doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul  
It is impossible to treat adequately the historical development of the idea of immortality 
of the soul within the limit of a thesis chapter. A treatment like that requires a thorough reading 
of two complicated concepts – soul and immortality – throughout history of Christian theology. 
It also requires careful assessments of different interpretations of biblical passages, the writings 
of Church Fathers and prominent theologians, as well as Church documents. Thus, I will limit 
my investigation to some instances in which the soul and immortality are explicitly mentioned 
and emphasized in the official teaching of the Catholic Church, particularly in doctrinal 
documents relating to anthropology and eschatology. 
Regarding anthropology, many Church Councils underscore the complex human nature, 
which can be summarized as a unity of duality – soul and body. Indeed, the Church through 
Vatican II states that God from the beginning made human nature one (Lumen Gentium no.13, 
see Denzinger 4132).1 That unity, that oneness of the human nature is constituted by a soul and a 
body. The soul-body composition of human nature was mentioned in the first centuries of 
Christianity, especially in context of conciliar discussions of Christ’s incarnation. For example, 
the body and soul in the human nature of Christ was set forth at the Council of Ephesus in 431, 
with the strong support of Cyril of Alexandria (DH 250) and the Bishops of the Church of 
Antioch (DH 272). Later, human nature in general, composed of body-soul, was affirmed at 
several ecumenical Councils, including Lateran IV in 1215 (DH 800), Vienna in 1314 (DH 900), 
Vatican I in 1870 (DH 3002), and Vatican II in 1965 (DH 4314). Through these Councils, the 
Church has constantly envisioned human as “whole and entire, body and soul, heart and 
 
1 References and English translations of ancient Church documents are from Heinrich Denzinger, Compendium of 
Creeds, Definitions, and Declarations on Matters of Faith and Morals, ed. Peter Hünermann et al., 43rd ed. (San 






conscience, mind and will” (DH 4303). The unity of duality [of body and soul] can be considered 
a truth of faith in Christian anthropology.  
Several papal, synodal and conciliar documents in Church history have treated in details 
different aspects of the soul, including its origin, number, nature, and characteristics. Concerning 
the soul’s origin, the Church proclaims that it is the immediate work of God. It does not originate 
from human generation (DH 360) or develop from a purely sensitive principle (DH 3220) or 
derive merely from physical or social influences (DH 4314). While the soul is not “a segment of 
God” or “of the substance of God,” it is “a creature created by the divine will,” as the first Synod 
of Toledo in c. 400 put forth (DH 190, 201). As for the number of souls, Constantinople IV in 
869-870 on authority of the Old and New Testaments, of Church Fathers and Doctors declared 
that “[each] man has one rational and intellectual soul,” and condemned as heresy the stance that 
each human has two souls (DH 657). Lateran V in 1513 condemned and reproved those who 
asserted or spread rumor about one common soul shared by all humanity (DH 1440). With regard 
to the soul’s nature, the Church states that it is spiritual or rational (Constantinople IV in 869, 
DH 657). Besides, that rational and intellectual soul is “of itself and essentially the form of the 
human body” (Council of Vienna in 1314, DH 902). The same doctrine of the soul as true and 
immediate form of the body was also confirmed at Lateran V in 1513 (DH 1440). Except for the 
concept of form, the rational soul was at times considered the “principle of life in man” (Pope 
Pius IX’s address to the Bishop of Breslau in 1860, DH 2833). As for its characteristics, the soul 
is thought of as “endowed with consciousness and will” (DH 4653). It is “much more precious 
than the body,” and thus doctors in their treatment of the bodies could not use any method 
harmful for the souls, as Lateran IV in 1215 instructed (DH 815).2 
 
2 In a similar manner, Church documents also treat the concept of body: its materiality, goodness, honor, and value 






With respect to the soul’s destiny after death, two initial magisterial documents in the 
Middle Ages are of greater importance. The first one is Pope Benedict XII’s constitution 
Benedictus Deus, promulgated in 1336. That constitution stated that the souls of the saints and 
those purified, after their departure from this world and until the resurrection and general 
judgement, “have been, are, and will be with Christ in heaven, in the heavenly kingdom and 
paradise, joined to the company of holy angels” (DH 1000). The same Pope added that the souls 
of the righteous enjoy “the intuitive and even face-to-face vision of God” and “have eternal life 
and rest” forever (DH 1000-1001). Meanwhile, the souls of those who dies in actual mortal sin 
“go down into hell immediately after death and there suffer the pain of hell,” though they will 
also appear with their bodies in the Day of Judgement before the seat of Christ (DH 1002). The 
second document is the Lateran V’s Bull Apostolici regiminis in 1513, which explicitly declared 
the immortality of the soul as a doctrine. That Council condemned those who asserted that the 
soul is mortal (DH 1440). It upheld that the soul is “individually infused” by God to each human 
person, and “it is immortal” (DH 1440). With those two documents, the Church provides a quite 
clear teaching about the immortality of the soul, that it survives bodily death and receives 
retribution right after death either in hell, purgatory, or paradise, until the general resurrection 
and judgement and the eternal life.  
In the twentieth century, the Church continued to reaffirm traditional belief in the 
immortality of the soul. In 1979, in the context of wide publicity of theological controversies 
over the existence of the soul and life after death, the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith 
 
4791). It is easy to recognize that the body attracts less attention than the soul in the history of doctrine, and concern 






(CDF) addressed all bishops with its “Letter on Certain Questions Regarding Eschatology.”3 
That letter reminds bishops of being faithful to the doctrinal teaching of the Church, and being 
careful in pastoral explanations. The text of the letter also states clearly the Catholic belief in the 
existence of the soul and its survival of bodily death, when it writes: 
The Church affirms that a spiritual element survives and subsists after death, an element 
endowed with consciousness and will, so that the ‘human self’ subsists. To designate this 
element, the Church uses the word ‘soul,’ the accepted term in the usage of Scripture and 
Tradition. Although not unaware that this term has various meanings in the Bible, the 
Church thinks that there is no valid reason for rejecting it; moreover, she considers that 
the use of some word as a vehicle is absolutely indispensable in order to support the faith 
of Christians.4 
The same letter also notes that neither Scripture nor theology provides enough light for a proper 
picture of life after death. However, Christians must maintain two essential points in their speech 
about the afterlife: “on the one hand, they must believe in the fundamental continuity… between 
our present life in Christ and the future life; … on the other hand, they must be clearly aware of 
the radical break between the present life and the future one.”5 In other words, the Church 
emphasizes both continuity and discontinuity regarding human person in present life and in the 
life to come. 
In 1992, the International Theological Commission (ITC) published a document titled 
“Some Current Questions in Eschatology,”6 which continued to confirm the doctrine of the soul 
and its immortality. Though the document does not have the value of the magisterium, as one 
member of the Commission – Candido Pozo – said, it represents an agreement amongst 
 
3 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, “Letter on Certain Questions Regarding Eschatology” (May 17, 1979). 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_1979057_escatologia_en.ht
ml. Accessed Feb 2, 2020. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 International Theological Commission, “Some Current Questions in Eschatology” (1992). 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/cti_documents/rc_cti_1990_problemi-attuali-






prominent Catholic theologians on certain issues of eschatology. Three points in the text relevant 
to our subject should be made clear here. First, relying on the Old Testament, the text defends the 
soul’s survival of death, claiming that “something of mortal human beings subsisted after death” 
(no. 3.1). Second, differentiating the Catholic teaching of the soul’s survival of death from the 
Platonic idea of the soul’s eternal emancipation from the body at death, the text underlines: “The 
state of the survival of the soul after death is neither definitive nor ontologically supreme, but 
‘intermediate’ and transitory and ultimately ordered to the resurrection” (no. 5.1). Third, 
referring to St. Augustine and St. Thomas’ conception of the soul as one part of the human 
whole, the text concludes that the soul separated from the body in intermediate state is not the 
“entire person,” even though it still “performs personal acts of understanding and will” (no. 5.4). 
The soul in that state, as the ITC asserted, can safeguard the continuity of human identity in the 
midst of discontinuity. In a nutshell, the ITC’s text relevant to our subject can be summed up in 
the following words: 
Between the death of people and the consummation of the world, it [the whole Christian 
tradition] believes that a conscious element of people subsists which it calls by the name 
of ‘soul’ (psyche), a term used also by Holy Scripture (cf. Wis. 3:1; Matt. 10:28); this 
element is already in that phase the subject of retribution. At the Parousia of the Lord 
which will take place at the end of history, there is to be expected the blessed resurrection 
of those ‘who are Christ’s’ (1 Cor 15:23). From that moment, the eternal glorification of 
the whole person who has now been raised begins. The survival of a conscious soul prior 
to the resurrection safeguards the continuity and identity of subsistence between the 
person who lived and the person who will rise, inasmuch as in virtue of such a survival 
the concrete individual never totally ceases to exist (no. 4.1). 
Also, in 1992, Pope John Paul II promulgated the Catechism of the Catholic Church 
(CCC),7 which presents “an organic synthesis of the essential and fundamental contents of 
Catholic doctrine…in the light of the Second Vatican Council and the whole of the Church's 
 






Tradition.”8 In the section regarding anthropology, the CCC stresses the fundamental unity of 
what is “corporeal and spiritual” in human (n. 362), that  “body and soul” is “a unity” (no. 364), 
and “matter and spirit” forms “one single nature” (no. 365). As for the soul, while Scripture uses 
the word to point to “human life or the entire human person,” the CCC adds that it also refers to 
“the innermost aspect” and “the spiritual principle of man” (no. 363). However, the document 
does not go any further and define what are meant by those concepts. Then, following previous 
Church Councils, it states that soul is the “form” of the body (no. 365), created immediately by 
God and is immortal, that it does not perish when it separates from body at death and will be 
reunited with the body at the final resurrection (no. 366). The immortality of the soul is also 
affirmed in the CCC’s section concerning the everlasting life (nos. 1020-1065), particularly in 
nos. 1022 and 1051 when it is mentioned explicitly in connection with retribution in the 
intermediate state.    
 The binding force of the doctrine of the immortality of the soul is emphasized in 1998, in 
a CDF’s document titled “Doctrinal Commentary on the Concluding Formula of Professio 
Fidei.”9 As the document points out, the concluding formula of profession of faith contains three 
“paragraphs intended to better distinguish the order of the truths to which the believer adheres” 
(no. 4). In the first paragraph, the object taught includes “all those doctrines of divine and 
catholic faith which the Church proposes as divinely and formally revealed and, as such, as 
irreformable” (no. 5). As these doctrines are “contained in the Word of God, written or handed 
down, and defined with a solemn judgement as divinely revealed truths either by the Roman 
Pontiff when he speaks ‘ex cathedra,’ or by the College of Bishops gathered in council, or 
 
8 CCC, n. 11. https://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/__P1B.HTM. Accessed Feb 2, 2020 
9 CDF, “Doctrinal Commentary on the Concluding Formula of the Professio Fidei” (1998). 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_1998_professio-






infallibly proposed for belief by the ordinary and universal Magisterium,” they require “the 
assent of theological faith” by all the faithful (no. 5). And amongst examples of the truths of this 
first paragraph, we find “the doctrine on the immortality of the spiritual soul and on the 
immediate recompense after death” (no. 11). That means the doctrine of the immortality of the 
soul belongs to the highest order of the truths of faith, equal to the doctrines contained in the 
Creedal formulas (cf. no. 11). And as the document states, “whoever obstinately places them in 
doubt or denies them falls under the censure of heresy” (no. 5). 
From those documents, we can make a few remarks concerning the Church’s teaching 
regarding the soul and its immortality. First, the Catholic Church affirms the existence of an 
element called “soul” in each and every human being. That rational, intellectual, spiritual soul is 
created by God as the principle of life and the immediate form of the body. Second, the Catholic 
Church asserts the immortality of the soul. It survives bodily death, is subject to retribution in the 
intermediate state, and waits for the resurrection at the Parousia of Christ. Third, the Catholic 
Church emphasizes a unity of duality in both anthropological and eschatological teaching. 
Human nature consists in the unity of body and soul. The soul separated from the body is not the 
entire person; neither is the corpse. Also, eternal life does not consist in the immortality of the 
soul alone, even if that soul is with Christ, but the reunion of the immortal soul with the 
resurrected body in eternal glory of God.  
Despite its clarity regarding anthropological and eschatological frameworks, Church 
magisterium does not define many concepts presented within them. The lack of definition 
renders many terms ambiguous, and many conceptions within some teachings, paradoxical. For 
example, in regard to anthropology, many Christians feel uncertain about the nature of human 






times, it is depicted as a substantial entity capable of subsisting in itself independent of the body. 
So, what is precisely the soul? Likewise, many Christians are uncertain of the nature of human 
body, its relation to the soul, and vice versa. Is the soul-body relation like “a ghost in a machine,” 
or that the machine in interaction with its surrounding environment gives rise to that ghost?  
Regarding eschatology, a problem arises. While the Church emphasizes the profound 
unity of body and soul because the latter is the form of the former, it at the same time adds that 
the soul can be separable from the body at death and remains alive, conscious, and willing, as if 
“having” the body or not makes no significant difference to the human soul. To many people, 
those assertions appear paradoxical. Besides, if the separated souls of the blessed have already 
enjoyed heavenly bliss as Benedictus Deus claimed (DH 1000), then why do such souls need the 
resurrected bodies? Are such bodies a kind of embellishment, like beautiful clothes added to 
wonderful “naked” souls?10 In sum, obscurity in terminology and paradox in conceptions are 
problems that need to be considered in an adequate treatment of the doctrine of immortality of 
the soul.  
Leaving aside those problems for the time being, let us now turn to an opposite vision, a 
nonreductive physicalist account of human nature and destiny, proposed by Nancey Murphy and 
several thinkers at the dawn of the third millennium. 
II. Nancey Murphy’s Physicalism and its Challenge to the Doctrine 
Though the immortality of the soul is considered a truth of faith in the Catholic teaching, 
it is challenged in contemporary theology. Notable among critics of the doctrine is Nancey 
 
10 Some theologians like St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas tried to advocate for the necessity of bodily 
resurrection. For example, St. Augustine claims that true immortality must be “a double immortality, an immortality 
affecting both the body and soul.” See John A. Mourant, Augustine on Immortality (Villanova University Press, 
1969), 1. Meanwhile, St. Thomas focuses on the human person as constituted of soul and body. Because Thomas 
thinks that “my soul is not I,” a blissful soul separated from the body is not enough for the salvation of the human 
whole. The resurrected body is a necessity. Thus, according to Thomas, two-phase eschatology is the consequence 






Murphy, whose elaboration on and defense of nonreductive physicalism in anthropology are 
widely known. In her physicalist account, the human is composed of one physical element, the 
body. There is nothing like a Platonic soul, which has immortality as a “native” characteristic. 
The body and resurrection of the body are proper Christian accounts of human nature and 
eschatological hope. 
Murphy’s physicalism poses a serious challenge to the doctrine in question. In fact, it 
rejects the immortality of the soul and asserts resurrection of the body, as if those two doctrines 
are mutually exclusive. Murphy’s thought makes many Catholics, who believe in both the 
immortality of the soul and the resurrection of the body, wonder: how can she come to the above 
assertions? On what grounds does she make her arguments? Are her grounds firm enough 
theologically? A detailed analysis of Murphy’s arguments is important, as they will help some 
Catholics understand not only Murphy’s stance, but also the challenge facing the doctrine of the 
immortality of the soul in today’s context.  
Historically, Murphy is not the first and only one who has challenged the concept of the 
soul and immortality in theology. In 1955, Oscar Cullmann gave the Ingersoll lecture at Harvard 
Divinity School in which he discussed immortality of the soul and resurrection of the body. He 
later published that lecture in a booklet titled Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the 
Dead? Witness of the New Testament.11 In his booklet, Cullmann sharply distinguishes the Greek 
doctrine of the immortality of the soul from the authentic New Testament teaching of the 
resurrection of the dead. For him, immortality of the soul and resurrection of the dead are 
mutually exclusive theses. We can only choose one of those two extremes, as it is impossible to 
integrate them in a harmonious eschatological synthesis. Fundamental to Cullmann’s argument is 
 
11 Oscar Cullmann, Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the Dead? The Witness of the New Testament, 






the presupposition of the unity/oneness of human nature in both life and death. His stance was a 
challenge to the traditional belief in immortal souls.12 
Four decades after Cullmann’s booklet, Nancey Murphy posed a similar question: “What 
happened to the soul?” With that questioning, she seriously attempts to re-examine the concept 
of soul in context of profound changes in modern sciences. Together with Warren Brown, Joel 
Green and other professionals in psychology, ethics, neurosciences, Murphy organized a 
conference in California in 1998 to discuss the question. Talks given at the conference were 
published in the same year under the title What Happened to the Soul? Scientific and Theological 
Portraits of Human Nature.13 The intersection of those portraits is a non-reductive physicalist 
account of the human person. Turning to the twentieth century, Murphy wrote extensively to 
defend non-reductive physicalist anthropology and expand its eschatological implications. The 
most noteworthy among her books is probably Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies (2006).14 
Murphy also co-authored or edited a number of books,15 and published several articles16 on 
different aspects of physicalism. Often starting with a query: “Are humans immortal souls 
temporarily housed in physical bodies, or are we our bodies?,”17 she gradually rejects the concept 
 
12 For a brief summary of Oscar Cullmann’s critique of immortality and resurrection, see Cándido Pozo, Theology of 
the Beyond (Staten Island, N.Y: St. Pauls, 2009), 131f.. 
13 Warren S. Brown, Nancey C. Murphy, and H. Newton Malony, eds. Whatever Happened to the Soul?: Scientific 
and Theological Portraits of Human Nature (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1998). 
14 Nancey C. Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies? (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).  
15 Books Murphy co-authored or edited includes Did My Neurons Make Me Do It?: Philosophical and 
Neurobiological Perspectives on Moral Responsibility and Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); 
Evolution and Emergence: Systems, Organisms, Persons (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2007); Downward 
Causation and Neurobiology of Free Will (Berlin Heidelberg: Springer, 2009), Human Identity at the Intersection of 
Science, Technology and Religion (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010). Murphy's latest book is A Philosophy of the Christian 
Religion: For the Twenty-First Century (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2018). Chapter 9 of this 
book is dedicated to the question of Christian anthropology 
16 Nancey Murphy, “Whatever Happened to the Soul? Theological Perspectives on Neuroscience and the Self,” 
Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1001, no. 1 (2003): 51–64; “Do Humans Have Souls? Perspectives 
from Philosophy, Science, and Religion,” Interpretation: A Journal of Bible and Theology 67, no. 1 (2013): 30–41; 
“Immortality Versus Resurrection in the Christian Tradition,” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1234, 
no. 1 (2011): 76–82. 






of immortal soul and dualism in favor of the body and bodily resurrection. Her position is best 
summed up in the preface of her book in 2006:  
My central thesis is, first, that we are our bodies – there is no additional metaphysical 
element such as a mind or soul or spirit. But, second, this ‘‘physicalist’’ position need not 
deny that we are intelligent, moral, and spiritual. We are, at our best, complex physical 
organisms, imbued with the legacy of thousands of years of culture, and, most 
importantly, blown by the Breath of God’s Spirit; we are Spirited bodies.18 
On what grounds does Murphy assert that we are our physical bodies and there is no soul 
and no immortality of the soul at all? In her books and articles, she often explains her vision on 
three different grounds: biblical criticism, history of doctrine, and contemporary sciences.  
 First, on biblical grounds, Murphy rejects trichotomism (the human as body-soul-spirit) 
and dualism (the human as body and soul), and asserts physicalism (the human as one substance, 
the body) as the proper biblical teaching. For her, trichotomism is a popular view among 
Christians,19 but it “has no textual warrant.”20 Meanwhile, body-soul dualism is “a Hellenistic 
addition to or distortion of biblical teaching.”21 As she argues, the early Hebraic accounts of the 
person were “holistic and physicalist,”22 and dualism only appeared later in the Old Testament 
“as a result of poor translations.” 23 In the New Testament (NT), Murphy agrees that conflicting 
accounts exist. Some of the NT texts appear dualistic, such as Matt. 10:28; Luke 16:19-31, 
23:39-43; 2 Cor. 5:1-10. However, as she argues, “NT authors are not intending to teach 
anything about human metaphysical composition” in such passages.24 Following James Dunn, 
she suggests that such texts should be viewed as Hebraic “aspective” accounts of the human, in 
 
18 Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?, ix. 
19 Murphy, “Whatever Happened to the Soul?”, 53. 
20 Murphy, “Whatever Happened to the Soul?”, 60. Of course, Murphy was aware of St. Paul’s 1 Thessalonians 
5:23. But in Murphy’s interpretation, St. Paul considered body, soul, and spirit as three aspects of one human reality. 
21 Murphy, “Whatever Happened to the Soul?”, 52. 
22 Murphy, “Whatever Happened to the Soul?”, 53. 
23 Murphy, “Whatever Happened to the Soul?”, 60. 






which “one aspect” stands for the whole person. They are quite different from Greek “partitive” 
accounts, in which parts can be separated from the whole.25 Thus, she concludes: if one adheres 
to partitive approach, there will be nothing like the biblical view of human nature. But from the 
aspective approach, NT authors do attest that “humans are psychophysical unities;” 
consequently, “Christian hope is staked on bodily resurrection rather than an immortal soul.”26 
To further support her argument, Murphy quotes several Christian exegetes to show that 
modern and contemporary biblical scholarship shares a physicalist vision of humans. She notes 
that H. Wheeler Robinson emphasizes the Hebrew idea of personality as “an animated body,” 
“not an incarnated soul.”27 Later, Rudolf Bultmann considers the Pauline concept of soma (body) 
as the whole human person.28 Recently, Joel Green puts forth that the dominant view of human 
person in the New Testament is that of “ontological monism,” and notions such as “the escape 
from the body” or “disembodied soul” fall outside parameters of New Testament thought.29 On 
the authority of these scholars, to name but a few, Murphy concludes: “The issue was settled in 
favor of physicalism as original Christian teaching.”30 She also adds that her conclusion is at 
least true to people in the academic world and not for conservative Protestants or Christian pews. 
Second, with a detail analysis of doctrinal development, Murphy argues that body-soul 
dualism is a Hellenistic doctrine to which the Christian tradition accommodated itself; however, 
that accommodation appears problematic in the light of modern philosophy and neurosciences 
 
25 James D. G. Dunn, The Theology of the Apostle Paul (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998), 54, cited in Murphy, 
Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?, 21. 
26 Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?, 22. 
27 H. Wheeler Robinson, The Christian Doctrine of Man (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1911), cited in Murphy, Bodies 
and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?, 8. Cf. Murphy, “Immortality Versus Resurrection," 78. 
28 Rudolf Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, vol. 1 (New York: Scribner, 1951), cited in Murphy, Bodies 
and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?, 10.  Cf. “Immortality Versus Resurrection," 78. 
29 Joel B. Green, “Bodies – That is, Human Life: A Re-examination of Human Nature in the Bible” cited in 
Whatever Happened to the Soul?, eds. Warren S. Brown et al., 28. 






and needs to be changed now. As Murphy observes, Tertullian followed the Stoic teaching of the 
soul as corporeal and generated with the body, while Origen adopted the Platonic idea of 
incorporeal and eternal soul.31 Later, St. Augustine modified the Platonic view: a human being is 
an immortal (not eternal) soul using (and not imprisoned in) a mortal body. The soul is tripartite 
(nutritive, sensitive, and rational) and hierarchically ordered. The relation between soul and body 
is similar to an agent with a tool.32 In the Middle Ages, St. Thomas Aquinas adopted Aristotelian 
hylomorphism,33 when he considered the soul as substantial form of the body. Because 
Aristotle’s soul or form is not a preexistent and transcendent entity, Murphy thinks that Thomas’ 
anthropology is a kind of “moderated dualism,” which has attracted many Christians until 
recently.34 But two modern theories has challenged Aristotle/Thomas’ hylomorphism. The first is 
Galileo’s atomist conception of matter, which suggests that matter is formed by atoms through 
physical forces. The second is Descartes’ identification of the soul with mind, cognition, and 
consciousness, which cognitive sciences consider as dependent on brain functions. These 
philosophical and scientific developments render the idea of soul as form of the body and source 
of cognition obsolete, while they highlight physicalism.35 Therefore, Murphy implicitly suggests 
giving up the Hellenistic body-soul dualism and returning to the original Hebraic physicalist 
conception of humans, which is the authentic Christian teaching.36  
Third, on the basis of contemporary scientific discoveries, Murphy argues against the 
concept of soul, and implicitly rejects the soul’s immortality. As noted above, the atomist 
revolution in physics has replaced the idea of soul as form of the body. In addition, evolutionary 
 
31 Murphy, “Whatever Happened to the Soul?”, 53. 
32 Murphy, “Whatever Happened to the Soul?”, 54. 
33 Hylomorphism is a philosophical theory, which holds that substance are constituted by two principles – form and 
matter. 
34 Murphy, “Whatever Happened to the Soul?”, 55f. 
35 Murphy, “Whatever Happened to the Soul?”, 56-58. 






biology has pushed many people away from the soul toward physicalism. The reason is simple: 
“if animals have no souls, then humans must not have them either… To claim that humans alone 
have the gift of a soul seems to force an arbitrary distinction [between hominid ancestors and 
modern humans] where there is much evidence for continuity.”37 Last but not least, cognitive 
neurosciences have stated that “nearly all of the human capacities or faculties once attributed to 
the soul are now seen to be the functions of the brain.”38 From those sciences, Murphy asserts 
that the person is “one substance, a physical body,” and “it is not necessary to postulate a second 
metaphysical entity, the soul or mind, to account for human capacities and distinctiveness.”39  
In short, on account of biblical criticism, history of doctrine, and contemporary sciences, 
Murphy rejected trichotomistic/dualistic anthropology and highlighted physicalist anthropology 
as the original and authentic Christian teaching. To return to that authentic teaching, she 
contends, we only need “to give up or finesse of the doctrine of the intermediate state” in 
Christian tradition; meanwhile, it contributes greatly to theology, especially to that of salvation 
and history. Murphy believes that if physicalist anthropology predominated rather than dualism, 
there would be no deprivation of the body for the flourishing of the soul. The goal of life would 
not be a place in heaven for individual souls, but the working for God’s reign on earth. However, 
working for God’s kingdom, for the transformation of the world and history does not mean a 
total abandonment of the afterlife, because Christians still have hope in the eschatological 
resurrection of the body, understood as the human whole.40  
 
37 Murphy, “Whatever Happened to the Soul?”, 59. 
38 Murphy, “Human Nature: Historical, Scientific, and Religious Issues,” in Whatever Happened to the Soul?, eds. 
Warren Brown et al., 1. 
39 Murphy, “Human Nature: Historical, Scientific, and Religious Issues,” in Whatever Happened to the Soul?, eds. 
Warren Brown et al., 13. For a detail treatment of the influence of atomist revolution in physics, Darwinian 
evolution in biology, and neurosciences, see Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?, chap. 2, pp. 40-70. 






In rejecting the soul in favor of the body, Murphy is aware of three problems she has to 
face: the possibility of reductionism, human distinctiveness, and personal identity. With great 
effort, she addresses those problems. To the question: “is the human being a mere physical body, 
determined by atoms, genes, or brain function?”, Murphy gives a negative answer. For her, a 
reductive physicalism is wrong for several reasons.  First, in highly complex organism like 
humans, it is not the behaviors of parts that determine the behaviors of the whole (bottom-up 
causation); instead, “holistic properties” of humans and their “interactions with environment” 
have causal influence on the behaviors of constitutive parts (top-down or downward causation).41 
Murphy admits that those principles of causation interact with each other, but she emphasizes the 
importance of downward causation to defend human freedom.42 Second, Murphy thinks that 
humans have the ability of self-direction, as they can modify goals, and thus transcend mere 
survival and reproduction, toward moral responsibility.43 Important factors for morality include a 
highly sophisticated language, a sense of self, abstract goals, and evaluation.44 As for free will, 
Murphy argues that humans are not completely autonomous. Yet, they have a certain degree, a 
“certain measure of autonomy from biological drives and social forces.”45 In short, Murphy 
asserts that the human being cannot be reduced to mere physicality or materiality; rather, the 
human being transcends it through morality and freedom thanks to the interactions with natural 
and social world.  
The second problem facing Murphy’s nonreductive physicalism is human distinctiveness 
from animals. To this problem, Murphy argues that human distinctiveness consists in our 
 
41 Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?, 73. 
42 Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?, 80. 
43 Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?, 85. 
44 Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?, 93f. 






relationship with God. However, we do not need a soul to account for it as traditional theology 
used to claim, because “God relates to us through our bodily capacities.”46 Part of Murphy’s 
logic is that God is immanent and acting in all physical realities,47 and God acts “at quantum 
level.”48 Therefore, God can “cause” religious experiences in people through ideas and feelings, 
which “are not beyond our ordinary neural equipment.”49 To differentiate authentic religious 
experiences from fantasies, the circumstances, consequences, and confirmations of religious 
community are important. Murphy notes: “individual and communal discernment” can 
“distinguish one’s own fancies and the voice of God.”50  
The third problem facing Murphy is human personal identity. Traditional theology often 
attributes this identity to the soul, while Murphy thinks that it is the body. But in the discussion 
of personal identity and the body, Murphy dramatically changes her concept of body, from 
physical body to the higher capacities enabled by the body. She says: “It is not the body qua 
material object that constitutes our identities, but rather the higher capacities that it enables: 
consciousness and memory, moral character, interpersonal relations, and, especially, relationship 
with God.”51 For Murphy, those higher capacities are tied to “a spatio-temporally continuous 
material object;”52 however, such an object is simply “contingent substrate,” and in the case 
where it is replaced while higher capacities are retained, then identity appears intact. She writes: 
“There is no reason in principle why a body that is numerically distinct but similar in all relevant 
 
46 Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?, 111. 
47 Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?, 124. 
48 Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?, 131. However, Murphy did not elaborate on how God’s action 
works at this level. 
49 Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?, 122. 
50 Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?, 123. cf.  See Nancey Murphy, Theology in the Age of Scientific 
Reasoning (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), chapter 5, for criteria from a number of Christian traditions 
for judging the authenticity of religious experience. 
51 Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?, 132. 






respects could not support the same personal characteristics.”53 Murphy believes that her 
construal of the “same body” [as higher capacities] allows for the possible explanation of 
personal identity through life and in the intermediate state.54 However, she does not articulate 
how that “same body” [as higher capacities] survives without the substrate in the intermediate 
state, and how new body would look like. After all, she just says we will be embodied, and new 
bodies will provide substrate for the ongoing and endless development of our mental life and 
moral character. However, we cannot know more about the nature of that “stuff.” In the end, she 
admits ignorance and suggests a point of silence when turning to certain matters of 
eschatology.55 
With what has been said, Murphy’s nonreductive physicalism provides an interesting 
interpretation of Christian anthropology and eschatology. It offers an alternative to the somewhat 
Hellenistic, dualistic approach many Christians have been used to. To a certain degree, Murphy’s 
contribution is significant. First, by re-examining the concept of soul in the context of profound 
changes in sciences, she bursts Christian anthropology and eschatology out, engages them in a 
dialogue with other disciplines such as biblical studies, philosophy, physics, biology, 
neuroscience, etc. Second, in emphasizing physicalism, Murphy raises the importance of the 
human body after it has been deprived for centuries, especially in strict Christian asceticism. 
Third, as Murphy asserts that human nature is part of nature as a whole, then social, historical, 
and ecological realities have ultimate value and become indispensable even in the eschatological 
resurrection.56 If physicalism is correct, we will have a coherent picture of humans in relation 
 
53 Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?, 141. 
54 Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?, 142. 
55 Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?, 145. 
56 Murphy argued: If humans are embedded in nature, physical beings are necessarily eco-physical beings. The 
resurrection of the eco-physical beings implies cosmic transformation. Ecological ethics or reconciliation is central 
to this transformation on earth, with the hope of eschatological transformation at the end of time. See Murphy, 






with the world and God. Such a coherent picture is very appealing in a fragmented, post-modern 
world today. 
The above significance, however, cannot exempt Murphy from questions. One can ask 
what is exactly meant by the “non-reductive” aspect of Murphy’s physicalism? Is that nothing 
other than what Christian tradition has called “soul” or “spirit” for millennia? My impression is 
that Murphy only rejects the concept of soul understood as a spiritual substance, which possesses 
immortality by nature. Meanwhile she keeps all human abilities or capacities once attributed to 
the soul (memory, self-consciousness, morality, relationship with God, personal identity) and 
attributes them directly to the body. With that attribution, she appears to highlight the value of 
human body and the absolute unity of that body with the higher capacities it enables. However, 
in Murphy’s articulation of personal identity, the physical body seems degraded. It is considered 
contingent substrate on which the higher capacities rest. A replacement of that substrate does not 
affect personal identity. Furthermore, the replacement of substrates, e.g., the earthly body with 
the resurrected one, also suggests the separation of higher capacities from both the old and new 
substrates. The question is how such capacities are preserved during time of replacement. If they 
are preserved by the power of God, as Murphy said about the preservation of memories in order 
to be transposed to a new body,57 then her reasoning is indeed a disguised return of body-soul 
separation and the immortality of the soul by God’s grace. In short, Murphy’s nonreductive 
physicalist theory of the humans seems coherent when she speaks about living humans. But 
when she comes to the issue of personal identity at death and beyond, she still has to face a 
serious challenge – the question of identity – with the nonreductive physicalist theory. 
 
57 “If God can create a new (transformed) body and provide it with my memories, is that really I? If so, then I shall 







III. Summary and Question  
I have presented two stances relating to the immortality of the soul. My aim is not to 
provide an exhaustive presentation of both the Church teaching and Murphy’s seemingly “anti-
Church” theory on the issue. Rather, I just provide a sketch of both viewpoints. On the one hand, 
we see the Church’s assertion of the soul and its immortality as a dogma in a strict sense. On the 
other hand, we find a challenge to, and a rejection of, that dogma in the name of the body and 
bodily resurrection.  
It is interesting enough that both stances claim to have biblical basis. As noted above, the 
CDF’s document in 1998 ranks the immortality of the soul among the “divinely and formally 
revealed” doctrines, that it is “contained in the Word of God.” Meanwhile, Murphy and 
nonreductive physicalists consider it part of the “Hellenistic addition to or distortion of biblical 
teaching.” Those contradictory claims give rise to a variety of questions: what does the Scripture 
precisely teach on this matter? Does it support or reject the immortality of the soul? Is that 
support or rejection clear and consistent? Those questions need to be answered so as to establish 
a firm biblical foundation for the doctrine. In the case that such foundation cannot be secured, the 
doctrine in question can be charged as an arbitrary imposition of the magisterium on the faithful. 
Another set of questions also need to be addressed: Is the immortality of the soul a 
Hellenistic philosophical doctrine, inserted into Christian tradition and falsely accepted as a 
proper Hebraic/Christian belief? Is that doctrine obsolete in our modern philosophical and 
theological understanding of human nature and destiny? Answers to those questions require a 
thorough investigation of the concepts of soul and immortality in Greek philosophy and in 






Greek philosophy and Christian theology. It will reveal the similarity and difference between two 
traditions, so influential in the history of the western world. 
I believe that these issues need to be addressed, if we want to have a clear understanding 
of the biblical foundation, doctrinal development, and contemporary vision of the doctrine of the 
immortality of the soul. Attempt to have such an understanding is fruitful, not only for a student 
in search of systematic explanation of the subject matter, but also for an ecclesial minister in a 
pastoral context, in which he must preach about the true Chrisitan eschatological hope. And as 
that hope, viewed from the longstanding Christian tradition, is staked not only on the resurrection 
of the body at the end of time, but also on the immortality of the soul, we need to have a look at 







CHAPTER II:  
THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL AND ITS BIBLICAL FOUNDATION 
 
One central point in the debate concerning the immortality of the soul is its biblical 
foundation. The CDF, in its 1998 document, affirmed the immortality of the soul as a divinely 
and formally revealed doctrine, contained in the Word of God.58 Meanwhile, Nancey Murphy 
argues that body-soul dualism along with belief in the immortality of the soul are Hellenistic 
additions to or distortions of the biblical monistic and physicalist teaching.59 For Murphy, only 
the spirited body and bodily resurrection are authentically biblical.60 Hence, on biblical grounds, 
there are two contradictory claims about the doctrine in question.  
On the surface, the contradiction seems to result from two different conceptions of 
biblical teaching, and a change in that conception may suffice to solve the contradiction. Murphy 
seems to identify authentic biblical teaching with the older Hebraic elements and rejects the 
Hellenistic elements. Meanwhile, Christian tradition accepts both the Hebraic and Hellenistic 
elements of the Scripture. With that acceptance, Greek texts using Hellenistic terminology are 
considered a part of biblical teaching, just like Hebrew texts using Semitic and Mesopotamian 
ideas and concepts. God reveals in many ways (Heb. 1:1), and one cannot limit God’s revelation 
to the Hebrew texts alone. Thus, an inclusive notion of biblical teaching, and an acceptance of 
 
58 CDF, “Doctrinal Commentary on the Concluding Formula of the Professio Fidei” (1998), no. 5. 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_1998_professio-
fidei_en.html. Accessed Feb 3, 2020. 
59 Murphy, “Immortality versus Resurrection,” 77; cf. “Whatever Happened to the Soul?”, 52f.  
60 Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?, 22. At the outset, Murphy seems more reasonable. In fact, the 
Bible does not explicitly state the immortality of the soul. Certain texts even consider the soul destructible (e.g., 
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the resurrection of the dead (Matt. 22:30f.; Luke 14:14; 1 Cor. 15:22, etc.). The transformation or redemption of the 
bodies is probably understood as the whole persons (Phil. 3:21f.; Rom. 8:21-23; John 5:28f.). Arguments for the 






pluralism in biblical anthropology and eschatology, provides a solution to the contradiction 
above. 
However, that easy solution cannot give adequate answers to more fundamental 
questions: Is it evident that the Hebrew Bible supports monism and physicalism, and undermines 
dualism? Is it true that the Hebrew texts contain no idea about the soul and immortality in the 
dualistic sense? We can ask those questions in a search for biblical foundation of the doctrine in 
question, not only in Greek but also in the Hebrew texts of the Christian Bible. Answering them 
will also disclose whether or not the immortality of the soul is a later addition to or a distortion 
of the resurrection belief. 
In this chapter, I will delve into those complicated issues. I will argue that the Hebrew 
Bible contains latent ideas about the soul and immortality of the soul in the dualistic sense of the 
traditional Catholic theology. Such ideas are more ancient than, but not contrary to, the belief in 
bodily resurrection. To support my argument, I will engage in contemporary biblical discussions, 
particularly the studies of Joel Green, James Barr, Robert Di Vito, John Cooper, Jon Levenson, 
Alan Segal, and Candido Pozo. Their diverse perspectives will contribute significantly to our 
comprehensive understanding of the subject matter. From their studies, we can get some clues 
for a vision of biblical anthropology and eschatology on which the doctrine of the immortality of 
the soul can be secured. 
I. The Soul in Contemporary Old Testament Theological Anthropology 
1. Biblical Scholarship and the Problems of Pluralism in OT Anthropologies 
What does the Old Testament (OT), especially the Hebrew Bible, say about 
anthropology? Does it contain any idea about the soul in the dualistic sense? To those questions, 






suggests a pluralism of perspectives. Such reluctance and suggestion can be found in The New 
Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible when it writes: 
[T]he OT contains neither a systematic reflection on anthropology nor an abstract 
definition of terms dealing with the human person as such. Therefore, a number of 
formulations are possible… Even more, because the books of the Bible reflect the 
different historical circumstances of their writings, there will not be a single, standard 
conception of the human but multiple and sometimes even apparently conflicting 
conceptions that ultimately enrich the Bible’s understanding.61  
The Eerdmans Dictionary of the Bible is even harsher when it notes:  
…The Bible also resists any systematic or developmental picture of the human beings 
and opposes the imposition of overarching assumptions about human beings on texts, 
whether these assumptions are rooted in psychology, anthropology, philosophy, 
metaphysics, theology, Christology, or historical-critical method.62  
With those remarks, general biblical scholarship refuses to single out a standard, consistent OT 
anthropological teaching. Diverse or even conflicting visions are welcome to enrich the 
discussion.  
However, from another angle, diverse and conflicting visions may also make the 
discussion confusing and unfruitful. In the name of pluralism, anyone can argue for any vision of 
anthropology, provided it has some biblical witness. To avoid confusion and to contribute to a 
fruitful discussion, the specification of some prevailing vision, which can coherently connect 
ideas and conceptions from different texts and contexts, seems helpful. That specification is a 
difficult task, as it requires a project of reconstruction, given that the Hebrew authors were quite 
uninterested in presenting a fully painted picture of the human in their works.  
 
61 Katharine Doob Sakenfeld et al., eds., The New Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible, vol. 1 (Nashville, TN: 
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2. Joel Green: Nephesh as the Human Whole 
Fortunately, several scholars have tried to figure out the prevailing account of the human, 
and many have touched upon the question of the soul. Among them, Joel Green is eminent for 
his physicalist, monistic approach. In Green’s vision of biblical anthropology, the human is 
essentially embodied, and there is no evidence of a substantial, ontological entity called a “soul” 
to be identified either by Scripture or by the methods of modern sciences.63 As Green explains, 
the term nephesh or psyche (soul), like basar, soma, or sarx (flesh, body), in the Scripture do 
“not necessarily refer to ontologically separate (or separable) parts of the human person,” but to 
“the entire human being.”64 Green’s explanation is similar to some contemporary interpretation 
of nephesh as the human whole, because the human does not have a “soul,” but is a “living 
soul/nephesh” (Gen. 2:7).65 With that holistic thinking in mind, Green sometimes portrays the 
soul/person as “a biopsychospiritual unity.”66 He believes that the unitary account of the person 
has been “almost unanimously supported” in biblical studies since the early twentieth century.67 
His remark is not incorrect, because many twentieth-century scholars, such as H.W. Robinson, J. 
Pederson, and O. Cullmann, have envisaged the human person as an indivisible, psychosomatic 
unity,68 quite similar to what Green upholds. 
 
63 Joel B. Green, Body, Soul, and Human Life: The Nature of Humanity in the Bible (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker 
Academic, 2008), 31f.  
64 Green, Body, Soul, and Human Life, 57-58. Cf. Freedman et al., eds., Eerdmans Dictionary of the Bible, 615 
65 Freedman et al., eds., Eerdmans Dictionary of the Bible, 615. The concept of nephesh as the whole person can 
also be found in Gen. 46:18 (Leah bore to Jacob sixteen souls); 46:27 (70 souls in the house of Jacob came to 
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3. James Barr: Nephesh as the Soul in Some Contexts  
The virtually unanimous support for a unitary account of biblical anthropology, however, 
has been put into question by James Barr. Barr is aware of the popularity of the unitary account, 
especially when nephesh in Gen 2:7 and certain contexts refers to the total unity of the human 
person.69 Nevertheless, he still raises several questions: is it the only meaning of nephesh 
throughout the Hebrew Bible? Is there any context in which nephesh means the soul in the 
dualistic sense? How did the ancient Hebrews have a consistent picture of humanity, which 
agreed so well with that of modernity, while the Greeks thoroughly misunderstood everything?70 
In raising the last question, Barr seems skeptical that the unitary account is not a reflection of 
ancient thought pattern, but “a product of modern sensibilities.”71 The problem, as Robert Di 
Vito points out, is not merely “a projection of modern antipathy to dualistic thinking,” but the 
insertion of “modernity's construction of personal identity as a whole” into the Bible’s 
anthropology.72 In the end, Barr neither elaborates on his skepticism nor pushes his critique as 
far as Di Vito does. Instead, he is more concerned with analyzing the Hebrew texts to find 
possible meanings of the term nephesh. 
Barr quickly realizes that nephesh is an ambiguous term. It has “a wide variety of 
meanings,” which often “overlap, but remain distinguishable.” “The choice between those 
meanings,” Barr argues, should be made after a careful analysis of “the verbal and syntactic 
contexts,”73 not on a presumption from other texts. Barr then specifies three primary meanings of 
the term. First, nephesh sometimes means “a total, indivisible, unity of the person,” as in Gen. 
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2:7.74 Second, in some contexts, “nephesh is much closer to what has traditionally been 
understood as ‘soul.’”75 For example, in Pss. 42 and 103, it seems that the psalmist is addressing 
his nephesh as his soul and not his totality of being; in Isa. 10:18, nephesh is distanced from the 
flesh; in Gen. 35:18, nephesh went out of Rachel when she died; in 1 Kings 17:21f, nephesh 
returned to a child, and he was revived at the prayer of Elijah.76 Third, in some other contexts, 
nephesh is closely associated with life (e.g., in Num. 23:10, Job 36:14), or with ruach (spirit) 
beyond bodily death (e.g., in Pss. 33:19, 56:14, 116:8).77 From the analysis of those texts in 
contexts, Barr submits his probable conclusion: 
[I]n certain contexts the nephesh is not, as much present opinion favors, a unity of body 
and soul, a totality of personality comprising all these elements: it is rather, in these 
contexts, a superior controlling center which accompanies, expresses and directs the 
existence of that totality, and one which, especially, provides life to the whole. Because it 
is the life-giving element, it is difficult to conceive that it itself will die. It may simply 
return to God, life to the source of life. Otherwise, it may still exist, and the thought of it 
being brought down to Sheol, or being killed, is intolerable… With the recognition of this 
fact the gate to immortality lies open. I do not say that the Hebrew, in the early times, 
‘believed in the immortality of the soul.’ But they did have terms, distinctions and beliefs 
upon which such a position could be built and was in fact eventually built.78   
In the above quotation, Barr moves beyond the merely monistic/holistic visions of the 
human. He does not dispute the unitary account, which he thinks belongs to “the Hebrew totality 
thinking.”79 He just challenges the idea that nephesh only refers to the total unity of the human 
throughout the Hebrew Bible. With a careful analysis, he shows how nephesh should be 
understood as the soul in a dualistic sense in some contexts. Barr also argues that in specific texts 
where nephesh signifies a unity, there are “formulations… which point towards more dualistic 
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conceptions.”80 In other words, Barr suggests a kind of duality in unity. Gen. 2:7 is an example. 
In that text, God created Adam from dust and the breath of life (neshama/spirit). For Barr, “the 
passage is obviously dualistic,” with “two basic ingredients,” the latter of which “comes close to 
the ‘soul.’”81 As the breath of life/spirit returns to God when dust returns to the earth (Eccl. 
12:7), the idea of the immortality of the soul/spirit is possible. In sum, in Barr’s understanding, 
the soul and immortality of the soul are at least latent in the Hebrew Bible. A thorough reading 
of the texts with an unbiased interpretation of their contexts can uncover those latent thoughts. 
4. John Cooper: The Interplay of Holism and Dualism in OT Anthropology 
While Barr only suggests the possibility of the soul and immortality in the Hebrew Bible, 
John W. Cooper makes bolder assertions. He strongly endorses both dualism and holism in 
biblical anthropology and discredits monism. He also argues for the concept of soul and the 
immortality of the soul in the Scripture. In a relatively recent article, which summarizes his 
vision of biblical anthropology and eschatology, Cooper writes:  
Biblical anthropology is demonstrably both holist and dualist. It is holist in teaching that 
God created, redeems, and will glorify humans as whole embodied persons. It is dualist 
in teaching that God created humans of two ingredients and that he sustains persons 
(souls, spirits) apart from their bodies between death and resurrection.82 
Cooper has elaborated on and defended the above thesis for the last three decades, with 
the publication of his book – Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting (1989, 2000) – and many 
articles.83 In his works, Cooper often rejects physicalist monism. He contends that “Green’s 
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anthropology is less than fully biblical,” since it fails to “deal adequately with all the relevant 
texts, their relations, and background data.”84 A comprehensive reading of the Scripture, Cooper 
says, discloses the dual characteristic of biblical anthropology: holism and dualism. One implies 
the other, to the extent that he names it “holistic dualism” or “dualistic holism.” Only a dual 
framework can explain both the wholeness of the human and the distinction of “parts, 
dimensions, and functions” within the human whole.85 To support his argument, Cooper presents 
an in-depth study of various Hebrew terms in contexts.  
As for the human wholeness (holism), Cooper analyzes the meanings of nephesh, ruach, 
basar, quereb, and leb.86 The analysis leads Cooper to three conclusions. First, the souls or 
spirits in the Hebrew Bible are not immaterial substances independent of the bodies, while 
organic and bodily organs are not purely biological. Second, physical and spiritual organs have 
both physical and spiritual functions, and this suggests the integration or unity of the 
psychophysical totality. Third, synecdoche – a figure of speech in which a part signifies the 
whole – is used very frequently. All these statements point toward holism.87 Nevertheless, 
Cooper warns against a generalization of synecdoche in biblical anthropology. Indeed, the 
Hebrew terms above do refer to one, total, indivisible human being, but sometimes they also 
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point to elements or parts of the whole.88 They still retain their distinctive meanings in some 
contexts. 
As for the distinction of parts, dimensions, and functions in the human whole, Copper 
supports a sort of dualism with three connected arguments. First, he notes that biblical holism 
does not entail monism. As he explains, biblical holism “does not necessarily imply that the 
whole is at bottom a single homogenous substance,” whether that substance is matter, spirit, or 
some neutral, indefinable “stuff.” Also, biblical holism “does not necessarily imply that if the 
whole is broken up, all parts disintegrate into chaos and nothingness.”89 Instead, when the whole 
is broken, a “secondary system” still exist and operate, though not with all properties and 
capacities of the whole.90 Within that framework, Cooper argues, the “soul” or “spirit” may exist 
without the organism, though it will be deprived by the loss.91  
Second, biblical dualism is evident in several texts regarding human composition, e.g., 
Gen. 2:7, Eccl. 12:7, Ezek. 37. Cooper says that in a non-philosophical way, “the OT picture 
repeatedly and consistently represents humankind as constituted from two different and mutually 
irreducible sources, elements, ingredients, ‘stuffs,’ or principles.”92 The first ingredient is the 
dust of the ground, of which the human bodiliness is made. However, that body is lifeless, and a 
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second ingredient must be added: ruach or neshama, the life-force or power of the breath that 
comes from God.93 On the second ingredient, Cooper comments: 
This second element, ruach, is not a thing – an individual entity which exists apart from 
living creatures. And so it is not a Platonic soul or an individual spirit. It is more like a 
kind of created energy produced by God and continuously flowing from him to the 
individual creature …. Whatever technical label—substance, element, principle, 
constituent—is attached, we must recognize that two kinds of ingredients are put together 
by God in order to create one holistic living creature. Perhaps the dust is a kind of 
substance in the sense of ‘stuff’ and the life-force is an empowering principle or kind of 
energy. They do not both seem to be ‘substances’ in the same sense of the word… But 
whatever each is, they amount to a mutually irreducible duality which God puts together 
to get one person.94  
Cooper is not ignorant of contemporary emergent theory. However, he contends that ruach is not 
a kind of power inherent in the dust so that when the dust was formed into a body, ruach or 
nephesh can automatically emerge and begin to function. As Cooper observes, the OT texts do 
not picture God making dust that way. Thus, materialistic monism is not adequate in 
conceptualizing the OT images of human nature, because ruach is not an expression of matter. 
Similarly, idealistic monism and even dual-aspect monism are not adequate, as the body is not an 
expression of ruach, and both body and ruach are not expressions of something else. Only a 
dualism “yet to be explicated”95 can explain the human makeup in the creation story.96  
Third, biblical dualism has a witness in the concept of rephaim (often translated into 
English as “the dead”) in Sheol. For Cooper, OT people believed that “the dead continue to exist 
in a ghostly form in an underworldly location called Sheol.”97 Their condition in Sheol is 
generally “inactive and unconscious,” but “they could become conscious and active” on some 
occasions, as seen in Isa. 14:9-10 and especially in the historical narrative in 1 Sam. 28.98 As for 
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the nature of rephaim, Copper argues that they are not mere shadows of those who lived on 
earth, but identical with them, though some properties have changed.99 By nature, rephaim can 
be either nephesh/ruach after the bodily death,100 or “some third thing,” a remainder when 
human flesh and life-force are subtracted.101 As Cooper says, the Israelites themselves had no 
clear view of this matter.102 But whatever it is, the rephaim is different from the dead body, and 
this difference suggests some sort of dualism. However, this dualism is only temporary, as the 
dead will return to bodily life (holism) at the eschatological resurrection.103 
In brief, through the analysis of terminology and contexts, Cooper affirms holism and 
dualism in the Hebraic anthropology and eschatology. Humans are created and redeemed 
ultimately as embodied beings (holism). They are created from two ingredients and retained 
disembodied temporarily in the intermediate state (dualism). This schema allows for the concept 
of soul/spirit and its survival of bodily death. The personal existence of rephaim in Sheol is a 
witness on the basis of which Cooper asserts the soul and its immortality in Hebrew biblical 
thinking. 
5. Summary and Discussion 
We have briefly surveyed contemporary scholarship on the concept of soul in the Hebrew 
Bible, with the three different viewpoints of Green, Barr, and Cooper being presented. Green 
rejects dualism and the soul in the traditional sense when he interprets nephesh as the human 
whole. Barr acknowledges the unitary meaning of nephesh but also suggests another reading in 
which nephesh points to the soul in the traditional sense in some contexts. Cooper moves further 
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than Barr's suggestion by holding both holism and dualism, from which he argues for the soul 
and its survival of bodily death with an in-depth analysis of nephesh, ruach, and rephaim in 
Sheol.  
Which one of those viewpoints is plausible in a comprehensive reading of the Hebrew 
biblical anthropology? In my opinion, physicalist monism is unlikely, as it is problematic in 
methodology, and it cannot convincingly explain the two “ingredients” in human composition in 
Gen. 2:7 as well as in other OT texts.104 Strictly speaking, not many biblical scholars are rigorous 
physicalists or monists. They often tend toward holism by insisting on human unity and 
wholeness, as Murphy and Green have done. However, their argument for a kind of ontological 
holism has one problem. It relies on a limited interpretation of nephesh as the human whole, plus 
a generalization of that interpretation throughout the Hebrew Bible, regardless of contexts. 
Hence, that sort of holism is challenged by Barr and Di Vito, who suspect that it might be a 
projection of anti-dualism sentiments or an insertion of modern expectation of integrity and 
wholeness into biblical anthropology.105 Thus, in a comprehensive reading of nephesh and the 
Hebrew biblical anthropology, the holistic dualism or dualistic holism implicitly suggested by 
Barr and explicitly endorsed by Cooper is probably a better choice. It recognizes holism 
generally supported in biblical scholarship since the early twentieth century and, at the same 
time, explains quite convincingly the complexity of human nature in the creation story and 
especially beyond death. 
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Not all biblical scholars accept Barr and Cooper’s vision. Green thinks that their 
approach relies too much on word-study. For Green, lexicography and semantics may be 
misguiding. Even if not, they “are capable of only limited and primarily negative results,” 
because they fail to present an “integrated anthropology.”106 This observation is not correct, 
given Barr and Cooper’s acceptance of holism, as noted above. However, Green’s remark raises 
the question of the role, guidance, and possible misguidance of linguistic tools, scientific lens, 
and metaphysical terminology in the contemporary discussion of the Hebrew biblical 
anthropology. Tools, lenses, and concepts from other disciplines, therefore, must be used with 
caution.  
The misleading nature of linguistic tools, to some extent, was pointed out by Robert Di 
Vito. In his article on OT anthropology in 1999, he criticizes the classical debate between 
monism and holism, soul and body dualism, and the modern linguistic shift from “soul” to “self.” 
He then proposes another reading of OT anthropology based on human social/relational nature. 
Instead of stressing individuality, personal unity, inner depth, and autonomy, as Charles Taylor 
did in his widely known philosophical anthropology,107 Di Vito clarifies four characteristics of 
the OT’s construction of personhood. First, the person in the OT is “deeply embedded, or 
engaged, in its social identity,” mainly through familial relationship. Second, the person is 
“comparatively decentered, and undefined with personal boundaries.” The soul or body as such 
is not in control; different organs or body parts such as eyes, ear, kidney, soul, jaw, bones, etc. 
operate as independent centers of activity. Third, the person is “relatively transparent, socialized, 
and embodied.” The mysterious “inner depth” or “inwardness” [soul/self/heart] is occasionally 
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mentioned (Ps. 51:8, Prov. 18:8), but it is barely emphasized in OT anthropology. Fourth, the 
person is dependent on others, especially the father and family members, despite a certain degree 
of autonomy.108 For Di Vito, those characteristics constitute the unique cultural background of 
the Hebrew biblical anthropology, different from those of Greek metaphysical or modern 
individualistic anthropologies. An understanding of that cultural background is necessary, Di 
Vito says, because it helps biblical scholarship to avoid the metaphysical debate, and thus move 
beyond it in the discussion of OT theological anthropology.109 
Di Vito’s vision is impressive. It highlights the importance of relationality in the 
construction of personal identity in the OT. In some way, it reminds us of H.W. Robinson’s 
suggestion of the “corporate personality” in ancient Israel.110 However, Di Vito does not pay 
much attention to the theological aspect, the relationship with God, in his construction of 
identity. He also leaves open the issues of human identity after death. Thus, Di Vito’s avoidance 
of the metaphysical question in OT anthropology has a price: he can say a lot about the identity 
of a living human, but not much about a dead human.111 But as long as the question about a dead 
human is still a question about humans, then eschatology is necessarily a part of anthropology. A 
comprehensive account of OT anthropology must take into consideration the personal identity 
beyond death. Thus, Green, Barr, and Cooper’s metaphysical discussion of the soul and 
immortality is appropriate, rather than misleading, as Di Vito might have thought. 
In sum, it is difficult to identify the Hebrew biblical anthropology. Considerations from 
different texts, contexts, and perspectives (e.g., philosophy, theology, sociology, linguistics, etc.) 
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disclose different aspects of the human. Taken as a whole, the Hebrew Bible contains not only 
holism but also dualism; not only ideas about human wholeness, but also the soul in the 
traditional sense, plus some hints of the survival of personal identity beyond bodily death. 
Though dualism, the soul, and the survival of personal identity are not frequently mentioned or 
emphasized, they are at least hidden in some texts, particularly when nephesh, ruach, and 
rephaim are used. A comprehensive reading of the Hebrew Bible, of its anthropology and 
eschatology, should not a priori rule out those conceptions. Instead, taking them into 
consideration not only respects the textual/contextual evidence in the Bible but also contributes 
to a fuller explanation of the Hebrew biblical anthropology and eschatology. 
Keeping arguments for the concept of soul in mind, we can turn to the question of the 
immortality of the soul. While Barr only suggests this immortality, Cooper affirms it in his 
discussion of rephaim in Sheol, especially in Isaiah 14 and 1 Sam. 28. But does the existence of 
rephaim in Sheol really imply the immortality of the soul? If not, what is the nature of 
immortality? How does it fit in with the resurrection belief? In the next part of this chapter, I will 
discuss those questions, with the hope for a better understanding of the OT and especially 
Hebrew biblical eschatology. 
II. Immortality of the Soul in Old Testament Eschatology 
Similar to the concept of the soul, immortality is subject to diverse viewpoints in OT 
eschatology discussions. Those viewpoints result from different anthropologies or different 
interpretations of rephaim and Sheol. In the following pages, I will present some studies on the 
immortality, particularly those of Green, Jon Levenson, Alan Segal, and Candido Pozo. Their 
constructions will help us understand how contemporary biblical scholarship conceives of the 






1. Joel Green: No Immortality of the Soul and the Problem of Identity 
As I mentioned in the previous part of this chapter, Green rejects the existence of a 
substantial, ontological entity called “soul” in the Scripture. He interprets nephesh as the total 
unity of the human person. Fundamental to his understanding of human identity is the “self-
conscious relationality” and “embodied narrativity” in the form of personal histories.112 As 
human relationality and narrativity are bound up with physicality in the cosmos, the death of the 
human entails not only the cessation of one’s body, but also “the conclusion of one’s embodied 
life, the severance of all relationships, and the fading of personal narratives.”113 Hence, for 
Green, death means total death, and nothing in us can survive it. He writes: “[A]t death, the 
person really dies… there is no part of us, no aspect of our personhood, that survives death.”114 
In short, there is no soul or immortality of the soul in Green’s thought. Every hope for life-after-
death requires embodiment, i.e., re-embodiment, which will provide the basis for relational and 
narrative continuity of the self.115  
Like other physicalists, Green has to face the question of personal identity in the traverse 
from this life to the life-after-death. In this matter, he attributes everything to God’s doing, to 
what Paul called “a mystery.” But is it a pure mystery, and nothing about it has been revealed, 
particularly in the Pauline letters? In the end, Green admits that 
… [H]e [Paul] hints at a relational ontology – that is, the preservation of our personhood, 
‘you’ and ‘me,’ in relational terms: with Christ, in Christ. This suggests that the 
relationality and narrativity that constitute who I am are able to exist apart from neural 
correlates and embodiment only insofar as they are preserved in God’s own being, in 
anticipation of new creation.116 
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The question of how human identities are “preserved in God’s own being” matters here, and 
Green does not clarify what he means by those words. Two possibilities can be guessed. If Green 
thinks that the identities (i.e., relationality and narrativity) are preserved ontologically, in 
themselves by God’s power, then he is admitting the immortality of the souls without using the 
term. However, if he thinks that all human elements are reduced to nothingness, and their 
continuity is only preserved as pure thoughts in God’s mind from which they will be recreated, 
then his reading of some Pauline texts will be strange: God’s ideas about X is with Christ, and it 
is not the case that X itself is with Christ or in Christ. That reading seems at odds with Paul’s 
belief in heavens, the earth, and the underworld (Phil. 2:10) filled with spirits, angels, powers, 
dominions, demons, etc. (Rom. 8:38; 1 Cor. 15:24). That reading also contradicts other Gospel 
texts such as Luke 16:19-31, which depicts the dead with their identities, consciousness, and 
wills. Thus, if Green thinks in the second way, his eschatology is not fully biblical, because it 
fails to take into account all relevant texts, their relations, and background data. But anyway, this 
issue relates to NT eschatology. The question for us is whether the Hebrew Bible teaches 
anything about the survival/immortality of the soul. In this question, we can turn to the study of 
Jon D. Levenson, an expert on the interpretation of the Hebrew Bible and Second Temple 
Judaism at Harvard School of Divinity. 
2. Jon D. Levenson: The Intimations of the Immortality 
Unlike Green, who focuses on biblical anthropology, Levenson studies OT eschatology 
and highlights the centrality of the resurrection belief in the Hebrew Bible and Second Temple 
Judaism.117 However, he does not rule out the concept of immortality. Instead, he explains it in a 
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way compatible with the resurrection belief, because both of them, in his opinion, belong to the 
biblical heritage. In Resurrection and the Restoration of Israel: The Ultimate Victory of the God 
of Life (2006), Levenson writes: 
[R]esurrection and immortality are both to be found in classical rabbinic Judaism, have, 
to some degree, precedents in the foregoing biblical and late Second Temple heritages, 
and needs not be seen as exclusive of each other. Indeed, they can and did coexist without 
tension… Resurrection we must define as an eschatological event … The expectation of 
an eschatological resurrection coexists easily with immortality so long as the latter is 
defined as the state of those who have died and await their restoration into embodiment, 
that is, into full human existence.118  
Levenson’s thesis is significant. He admits the concept of immortality as part of the 
Hebrew biblical belief. He also defines it as the state of those who have died and wait for bodily 
resurrection. However, Levenson does not think of individual immortality as the natural survival 
of “an indestructible core of the self.”119 Instead, he suggests the immortality of a person through 
his/her lineage in relationship with God.120 The problem is: how can Levenson account for the 
existence of rephaim in Sheol? 
Reflecting on Sheol, Levenson maintains that the concept refers to a state of lifeless and 
miserable existence. Comparing Sheol in Job 7:7-10 with the Akkadian account of “The Land of 
No Return,” Leveson concludes that “the dead have existence without life – an existence of 
unqualified and interminable unhappiness, unqualified and interminable hopelessness.”121 He 
believes that the gloomy conception of Sheol is shared amongst biblical scholars, including J. 
Pedersen and J. Gray, who think that all the dead go to Sheol to continue an “altogether 
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negative” and “wholly undesirable” existence.122 That negative/undesirable existence, Levenson 
argues, is not limited to those who died physically, but expands to those endangered by death 
because of hostility, oppression, or illness, i.e., to the living-dead.123 Thus, Sheol is not so much 
a place in time, but a metaphor, “a mode of existence” characterized by “weakness, defeat, 
depression, vulnerability, and the like,” especially when the cries of the inhabitants to God are 
not heard.124 In sum, the concept of Sheol refers to the realm of death, physically or spiritually. It 
is less than life, let alone immortal life. 
Does everyone who dies go to Sheol? On that matter, Levenson disagrees with Pedersen 
and Gray. He believes that Sheol is not the common “destination” for all people. Indeed, if the 
wicked and the righteous share the same fate in Sheol, then what is the ultimate justice of God? 
What is the meaning of the blessings God gives to righteous people like Abraham, Moses, and 
Job?125 Moreover, biblical texts do not state that those righteous people went to Sheol when they 
died. Where would they have gone, if not to Sheol? As biblical authors are silent about their 
destination, Levenson tries to make his conjecture in this regard. 
Levenson suggests that the life of the righteous like Abraham, Moses, and Job continues 
through the survival of their lineage. For example, Abraham died old and contented, seeing not 
only his favorite son Isaac being married but also Ishmael and six other sons, some of whom 
would beget great nations (Gen. 25:1-18). Similarly, Job lived to see “his children and children’s 
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children, four generations” (Job 42:16 - NRSV), quite similar to Joseph, who “saw [his son] 
Ephraim’s children of the third generation” (Gen. 48:11- NRSV). For Levenson, instances of 
seeing future linage are “hardly coincidental or irrelevant,” but they show how those people died 
fulfilled because the promises to them were realized even in their lineage.126 As for Moses, there 
was no mention of his descendants, but God showed him the whole land that Israel was going to 
take possession of for generations (Deut. 34:1). For Levenson, that remarkable scene is 
reminiscent of the patriarchs’ viewing generations of descendants, because “all Israel has 
become, in a sense, the progeny of Moses.”127 In short, obtaining a future lineage stands in 
opposition to Sheol. It is the continued existence of those who die fulfilled in the blessings of 
God. It is an intimation of immortality.  
Another intimation of immortality is the relationship with God, expressed through the 
devotion to the Temple, the dwelling place of God. As Levenson observes, the devout Israelites 
yearned to go to the Temple to dwell, but not to die or to be buried there. Why? Because the 
Temple itself is a place full of life, and nothing deadly can enter it (Lev. 21:1-4, Num. 19). In the 
Temple, pious Israelites are under the protection of the God of life, like the trees planted there 
(Pss. 52:10; 92:13-16), free from all kinds of chaos, decay, and death.128 Also, in the Temple, 
they claim to find the “fountain of life” (Ps. 36:6-11), from which springs the stream of living 
and healing water (Ez. 47:1-12). With those images in mind, Levenson concludes that “the 
Temple… was thought to be an antidote to death, giving a kind of immortality to those who 
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dwell there.”129 That kind of immortality is not given to individual and disembodied souls, but a 
community of embodied persons, a community of brotherhood (Ps. 133:1-3).130  
With those speculations in mind, Levenson upholds a duality of death and existence 
beyond death. For those who die “prematurely, violently, bereft of children, rejected by God, or 
brokenhearted” for whatever reason, they will face Sheol, “the prolongation of unfulfilled 
lives.”131 For those who die fulfilled, the Hebrew Bible does not propose any destination. 
Instead, it suggests their prolongation “in the form of descendants” - an expression of the 
immortal dimension of their selves.132 Through “familial or national continuity,” they remain in 
relationship with the God of life, who dwells in the Temple.133 These two factors – descendants 
and the Temple – are antipodes to Sheol. They are intimations of immortality, until the 
eschatological resurrection of the body and entry into the eternal life. 
Levenson’s construction provides a fascinating interpretation of the Hebrew concepts of 
death, Sheol, and antipodes to Sheol. In addition, the connection of those concepts presents a 
coherent picture of life, death, the [intimations of] immortality, the resurrection of the body, and 
eternal life in Second Temple Judaism. In that picture, immortality is not the survival of the self, 
but the family, because “the self of an individual in ancient Israel was entwined with the self of 
his or her family.”134 A person, including his/her nephesh, therefore, may die completely, but the 
identity survives death through the survival of the family, ethnic group or nation, understood as 
the extended family.135 In some way, Levenson’s vision of eschatology fits in well with Di 
Vito’s social/relational anthropology, and both echo H.W. Robinson’s notion of “corporate 
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personality,” which is very different from the modern, more individualistic, conception of human 
personhood. 
 Levenson’s sort of “corporate eschatology” is supported by much textual evidence, but it 
still elicits some questions from a minority position. First, is Sheol an utterly negative term 
referring to the miserable existence of the dead? Can it be neutral in some contexts, where it 
points to a part of ancient Israel’s cosmology, with heaven, the earth, and Sheol under the earth 
(e.g., in Ps. 115:16-18, cf. Phil. 2:10)? Second, is it correct to say that only those who die 
unfulfilled go to Sheol, when some Hebrew texts consider it the universal destiny all people 
(Hab. 2:5; Ps. 49:10-12; Eccl. 9:2; and Dan. 12:2)? Third, are the identities of those who die 
fulfilled subsumed entirely into their familial, ethnic, or national identity, without remainder? 
Those questions are not treated adequately in Levenson’s construction and need to be taken into 
consideration.  
Regarding our investigation, the question about personal identity beyond death seems 
essential, and Levenson is not clear about it. Sometimes, he rejects the idea of the survival of a 
disembodied soul or self beyond death.136 Other times, he seems to accept it, as when he says: 
“One should not assume that… people simply do not exist between death and resurrection. 
‘Many of those that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake,’ one reads in Dan. 12:2, in 
language that suggests inactivity (‘that sleep’) rather than nonexistence or the miserable fate of 
those dispatched to Sheol.”137 But who are the subjects of the sleep and inactivity? Are they 
always sleeping and inactive? Isaiah 14 and 1 Sam. 28 provide a depiction different from that of 
Levenson. In some way, those texts can hardly be explained within Levenson’s framework of 
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corporate eschatology. At most, they can be considered examples of a minor or conflicting view 
in comparison with the mainstream Hebraic eschatology that Levenson is trying to unearth. 
3. Alan F. Segal: The Climate of Immortality in First Temple Judaism 
Alan F. Segal, in his detailed study of the afterlife in Western religions, proposes a theory 
capable of explaining the conflicting ideas above. In Segal’s reconstruction, ancient Israel’s 
neighbors – Egypt, Mesopotamia, Canaan – were obsessed with the afterlife, either optimistically 
(the soul of the dead going to the god of the stars) or pessimistically (the soul going down to the 
god/goddess of the underworld). Meanwhile, the Hebrew Bible, though borrowing myths, basic 
concepts, and even texts from those neighbors, is almost silent about life beyond the grave.138 
The reason, as Segal suggests, consists in the conflict between Israel’s initial belief in the 
survival of the “soul” in the First Temple period, and the exclusive worship of YHWH strongly 
instated later in the Second Temple period. According to the belief in immortality in earlier 
period, the dead were often deified as ancestral gods. They were called the “divine/holy ones,” 
“healers,” “knowing ones,” as found in the book of Isaiah. The cult of the dead and necromancy 
were probably popular practices.139 Those beliefs and practices seriously violated monotheism, 
for they would open the door for idolatry. Therefore, when the Hebrew Bible was redacted in the 
Second Temple period, those beliefs and practices were described as pagan, forbidden and 
punished (Lev. 19:31, 20:27; Deut. 18:9-14). Accounts about them were carefully kept out of 
Israel’s written tradition. However, some scandalous texts were still kept because of their 
importance to Israel’s national history or literature (e.g., Saul’s resort to necromancy in 1 Sam. 
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28).140 Thus, according to Segal, the immortality of the soul/spirit was not an alien belief in First 
Temple Israel. It was kept out later on because of editorial biases. But that belief returned in late 
Second Temple Judaism,141 together with the rise of belief in bodily resurrection. 
If Segal is correct, then belief in the immortality of the soul/spirit was more ancient in 
Judaism, prior to belief in bodily resurrection. This would be counter evidence to the assertion 
that the immortality of the soul was a Hellenistic doctrine added to the Hebraic belief in the 
bodily resurrection. Segal’s vision is quite compelling, and it is shared by several scholars, such 
as Stephen Cook and Mark Finney.142 It also resembles that of Candido Pozo, a systematic 
theologian who provides a detailed treatment of the development of biblical anthropology and 
eschatology.  
4. Candido Pozo: Two Anthropological Schemas and the Evolution of Sheol 
 Decades before Segal reconstructed belief in the afterlife in Judaism, Pozo had already 
asserted that “the idea of resurrection is, without doubt, biblical, yet very late.” Meanwhile, “the 
idea of survival is not only biblical but also…the most ancient notion found in Scripture 
concerning the beyond.”143 Pozo argues for his assertion with two novel thoughts, one 
concerning the ancient Israel’s anthropology and the other, its eschatology. 
Analyzing various concepts in primitive Judaism, in “the patriarchal era,” Pozo realizes 
two schemas being utilized to speak about the human. About a living human, the schema is 
unitary. Within that schema, basar (flesh) and nephesh/ruach (soul/spirit) do not stand in 
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opposition or separation, but they are strongly connected. The nephesh/ruach, then, is not a 
substantial soul/spirit capable of subsisting in itself, but it is the “life” of the flesh.144 However, 
referring to a dead human, the schema is very different. It maintains a “real distinction” between 
the cadavers and rephaim, and thus paves the way for the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. 
As Pozo observes, “while the corpses are in the tomb, the rephaim survive with an existence that 
is as misty or shadowy as you like, but they nonetheless survive, in Sheol.”145 Pozo argues that 
Sheol is not identical with or a metaphor for the tomb. He analyzes several texts such as Gen. 
25:8ff.; 37:35; 49:33-50:3 to show the distinction between those concepts.146 Pozo also uncovers 
different characteristics of the rephaim’s existence in Sheol: weakness, anonymity, dormition 
(but capable of awakening, as in 1 Sam. 28), lacking sensitivity, unable to praise of God, without 
differentiation between the just and the wicked, deprived of retribution, etc. He states that the 
rephaim’s existence in Sheol is diminished, but it is not an annihilation; rather, it is survival and 
perdurance. This primitive idea of survival, Pozo argues, is “not a highly developed concept of 
the soul,” but it is significant because it marks the ancient Israelites’ “initial effort of 
conception.”147 And it lays the foundation for further efforts later on. 
Another effort of conception that Pozo unearths is the evolution of Sheol. In the early 
times, Sheol referred to “a common and undifferentiated domicile for all the dead”; however, 
that concept underwent “a profound transformation” when retribution after death was 
introduced.148 Some prophetic literature started speaking about differences in Sheol. For 
example, Isa. 14:15 and Ezek. 32:22-23 mention the depths of the Pit, while Proverbs 7:27 and 
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9:18 speak of Sheol with chambers and strata.149 Accordingly, Sheol is conceived as an 
underground reality with different levels, the lower for the wicked and, implicitly, the higher for 
the just. That notion continues until the inter-testamentary time (Enoch 22) and the NT period 
(Luke 16:19-31, with an abyss between levels in Sheol).150 In parallel with that notion of Sheol, 
some Psalms suggest God’s deliverance from Sheol (Ps. 16:10; 49:15). In this second notion, 
Sheol is like hell, the “place” only for the wicked, while the just are delivered to a celestial 
realm, paradise, or heaven (Ps. 73:25, Enoch 61:12, Luke 23:43).151 As Pozo observes, those two 
conceptions of Sheol co-exist even in one work (e.g., Enoch and Luke), and they reveal the 
complexity of biblical cosmology and eschatological doctrine in late Second Temple period. The 
picture of Sheol and paradise becomes even more complicated when Hellenistic concepts 
(psyche in Hades) and the Ugaritic ideas (the Elysian Fields and banquet) were suggested 
respectively through the book of Wisdom (Wis. 3:1-3; 8:19-20; 9:15-17; 15:8) and the Psalms 
(Pss. 23; 43:3; 61:8).152 Though such concepts are added to the original Hebraic thoughts about 
the rephaim in Sheol, they clarify rather than distort the original Hebraic thoughts about 
retribution in Sheol in later its development. 
One last thing worthy to note is the belief in personal, bodily resurrection. It would be a 
mistake to think that such a belief is the most ancient and the only eschatological belief in the 
OT. Indeed, that belief emerged quite late, in Second Temple Judaism. Undisputed texts about 
bodily resurrection include Dan. 12:1-3 and 2 Mac. 7. Those who rise in Dan. 12:1-3, as Pozo 
says, “can be none other than the rephaim,”153 those who have died and “sleep in the dust,” both 
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the just and the wicked. 2 Mac. 7 (vv. 9, 14) only suggests the bodily resurrection of the just, 
who suffered because of their obedience to God. Ezek. 37, which is probably earlier than 2 Mac. 
7, also speaks of the resurrection, but it is undoubtedly a metaphor for the restoration of Israel 
after the exile (Ezek. 37:11). The last important text is Isa. 26:19, which states: “Your dead shall 
live, their corpses shall rise. Oh, dwellers in the dust, awake and sing for joy…” It is disputable 
whether the text is a metaphor for national resurrection or about individual resurrection. What is 
interesting in the text is its suggestion that the continuity of existence is guaranteed not only by 
the rephaim alone, but also by the corporeal element, the corpses themselves.154  
In brief, Segal and Pozo’s reconstructions provide a broad, developmental picture of the 
belief in the immortality of the soul in the First and Second Temple Judaism. Within that picture, 
the immortality of the soul belonged to the primitive Hebraic belief. For Segal, that belief 
seemed to be suppressed for a time, but not completely wiped out from the Hebrew Scripture, 
until it emerged again in late Second Temple Judaism. Pozo does share the same vision with 
Segal when he argues for the development of the concept of rephaim in Sheol throughout the 
Hebrew Bible. For Pozo, the immortality of the soul is a constant Hebraic belief, from the 
ancient times until NT times.155  
5. Summary, Discussion, and Conclusion 
 Different biblical scholars uphold different viewpoints on the immortality of the soul. 
Green emphasizes human wholeness and rejects the survival of the soul. He therefore cannot 
fully explain the question of personal identity in some NT texts. Levenson meanwhile highlights 
the corporate identity and a kind of corporate “immortality.” His vision is very interesting, but 
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like Green, he fails to adequately explain the individual identity, consciousness, and activity of 
the rephaim in Sheol in some OT texts. Segal, with his construction of the afterlife in the ancient 
Near East, shows how belief in the survival of the soul was part of ancient Israel’s religious 
heritage, and how it was kept out of the Hebrew Bible in Second Temple Judaism because of its 
conflict with monotheism. Pozo also thinks that belief in the immortality of the soul was part of 
the primitive Judaism, and that belief developed along the history of Judaism until NT times. 
Segal and Pozo’s studies suggest that the immortality of the soul is not a merely Hellenistic 
doctrine added to the Hebraic belief in bodily resurrection; rather, the former is more ancient, but 
not contrary to the latter. Both of them belong to the Hebraic religious heritage. 
 The many visions regarding the soul and immortality in the Hebrew Bible raise the 
question of methodology in biblical reading and interpretation. At one end, we can choose one 
viewpoint (e.g., monist, physicalist, structuralist), from which other viewpoints are both 
welcome and criticized. At the other end, we can choose a more comprehensive reading and 
interpretation, which may result in “a systematic and developmental picture” of biblical 
anthropology and eschatology. Though that picture is resisted by scholars like Denise 
Dombkowski Hopkins,156 it appears compelling to me because of its integration of greater 
textual, contextual, and extratextual evidence. In particular, I appreciate Green, Di Vito, and 
Levenson for their emphasis on relationality with others and with God. Yet, the personal, 
individual aspect emphasized by Barr and Cooper, Segal and Pozo is equally important. An 
integration of both aspects into a nuanced formulation will give us a better understanding of the 
Hebraic, and thus biblical, anthropology and eschatology. 
 






As for some specific questions posed at the beginning of this chapter, some conclusions 
can be made after our discussion of contemporary biblical scholarship. 
First, the Hebrew Bible does not evidently present a physicalist, monistic anthropology. 
Instead, it presents a holism in which the human is created in unity and wholeness. Biblical 
holism does not rule out constitutive parts or functions within the human whole. Similarly, it 
neither rejects the relationality that constitutes personal identity, nor subsumes personal identity 
into that relationality, especially after a person’s death. A fair balance between parts and unity, 
relationality and individuality characterizes Hebraic biblical anthropology, if it is taken as a 
whole. 
Second, within the Hebrew Bible, there are certain hints at the concept of “soul” that 
survives bodily death. A careful analysis of the contexts in which nephesh, ruach, neshama, and 
rephaim in Sheol are used is necessary to uncover such hints. Because Scripture depicts without 
defining what nephesh, ruach, neshama or rephaim really mean, theological reasoning or 
speculation can be made regarding those concepts.  
Third, belief in the survival of the soul is not a Hellenistic doctrine added to the Hebraic 
teaching of bodily resurrection. Rather, it belonged to Israel’s most ancient religious heritage. It 
developed over time, prior to the emergence of the bodily resurrection. Though that belief was 
not emphasized in the early Second Temple Judaism, it emerged powerfully in late Second 
Temple Judaism, with the borrowing of some concepts from the Ugaritic and Hellenistic world. 
Together with belief in bodily resurrection, it forms a duality in late OT eschatology, which 
expands into the NT and lays the foundation for the two-phase eschatology of Christianity. 
The use of Greek concepts and thoughts in the OT and NT, which expands to the 






the soul similar to that of Hellenistic/Platonic philosophy? If not, what is the difference between 
them? If they are different, is it possible that the Hellenistic/Platonic philosophy overshadows the 
biblical/Christian vision? Those are serious questions. I will deal with them in the next chapter, 








CHAPTER III:  
A CATHOLIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL:  
JOSEPH RATZINGER AND KARL RAHNER 
 
In this chapter, I will explore contemporary Catholic understanding of the doctrine of the 
immortality of the soul. I will focus on the thoughts of two prominent theologians – Joseph 
Ratzinger and Karl Rahner. The context of my exploration is the debate over the origin, 
coherence, and relevance of the doctrine. As noted previously, the Catholic Church considers the 
immortality of the soul a doctrine of faith, firmly founded on the Scripture. By contrast, Nancey 
Murphy believes that it originates from Platonic philosophy, inserted into the Bible, and 
mistakenly accepted as a Christian doctrine. Worse than that, the concept of a substantial soul 
appears obsolete in modern scientific thinking. For that reason, she suggests the rejection of that 
doctrine to support only the belief in bodily resurrection. 
In the last chapter, I have argued that the doctrine of the immortality of the soul has roots 
in the ancient Hebraic tradition. It originates from the belief in the survival of rephaim in Sheol. 
The utilization of Greek terminology in the late OT period only makes that belief more 
intelligible in the Hellenized world. In this chapter, I will argue that the Christian concepts of 
soul and immortality are quite different from those in Hellenistic philosophy. Moreover, those 
concepts, if properly understood, are not obsolete or irrelevant, but necessary for an 
understanding of Christian anthropology and eschatology. They also serve as starting points for 
further thought on the mystery of the human person in earthly life and beyond the grave. 
To begin, I will present Ratzinger’s understanding of the immortality of the soul. His 
context and disputes, his retrieval of biblical data and theological development reveal the 






However, some difficulties face Ratzinger’s approach to our subject matter. Rahner, meanwhile, 
offers an alternative vision, which may illuminate the difficulties facing Ratzinger. However, a 
close look also reveals that Rahner’s theory is not without questions. A comparison between 
Ratzinger and Rahner will disclose their points of convergence and divergence. It also leads us to 
some conclusions regarding contemporary Catholic understanding of the doctrine. 
I. Ratzinger: “A New Concept of Soul” and “Dialogical Immortality” 
1. Ratzinger in Context 
Ratzinger developed his eschatology at a time of crisis when the theology of the last 
things moved into the center of theological landscape.157 Two developments led to that critical 
change. In Christianity, there was a fresh understanding of the eschatological character of Jesus’ 
message: the end of the world is imminent, and the Kingdom of God is breaking in. In world 
affairs, Marxism, with its realism, also proclaimed the coming of the end time, not by God’s 
power or religion, but by scientific knowledge and socio-economic and political commitment. 
Both the ecclesial and secular “eschatological” movements emphasize corporate endeavors to 
create a new world. The older form of eschatology – the salvation of one's soul – was pushed 
aside for its lack of contribution to praxis.158 In the context of fervent collective actions, 
Ratzinger makes a suggestion: “to integrate opposing elements” and “to strike a fair balance” 
between the care for one’s well-being and the care for the common work.159 With that 
suggestion, Ratzinger proceeds to discuss both the individual and corporate dimensions of 
eschatology. 
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2. Challenging “Total Death” and “Resurrection in Death”  
As for individual eschatology, Ratzinger maintains both the immortality of the soul and 
the resurrection of the body. It is indeed an attempt to integrate opposing elements because at the 
time he wrote the work on eschatology, the former was being discredited as an outdated Platonic 
doctrine, while the latter alone was being emphasized as biblically authentic.  
To defend the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, Ratzinger criticizes two hypotheses 
that try to surpass it. The first one is “total death,” upheld by several Protestant theologians, 
including C. Stange, A. Schlatter, and to some extent P. Althaus. Appealing to Scripture and 
Luther, those theologians rejected the Platonic separation of soul and body at death. For them, 
death means total death. The proper Christian vision of the afterlife, for them, is nothing but the 
resurrection of the whole person.160 That vision, as Ratzinger observes, stems from two sources: 
“an allegedly biblical idea of the absolute indivisibility of man,” and “a modern anthropology 
worked out on the basis of natural science,” which identifies “the human being with his or he 
body, without remainder.”161 Ratzinger agrees that the elimination of the immortality of the soul 
may remove certain conflicts between faith and modern thought about the human; however, it 
does not bring faith much closer to science. Over against “total death and resurrection alone” 
hypothesis, Ratzinger asks several questions: supposing that the elimination of the concept of 
soul and immortality secures the unity of the human person, would the scientific world believe in 
the resurrection? What would happen between one’s death and the general resurrection at the end 
of time? What will secure the resurrection identity, if death is total death? Though those 
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questions are quite philosophical, Ratzinger thinks that a refusal to answer them does not 
contribute to a fruitful discussion in eschatology.162 
The second hypothesis Ratzinger criticizes is “resurrection in death.” That hypothesis 
emerged from K. Barth and R. Bultmann’s thoughts and attracted some Catholic theologians, 
such as G. Greshake and G. Lohfink. In that hypothesis, the dead person steps out of time into 
the timeless, and thus into the resurrection immediately after death. For Ratzinger, “resurrection 
in death” is problematic because it elicits several questions. First, how can the timeless be 
divided into parts – one before and one after the dead person’s entry into it? Second, if the 
resurrection in death is a timeless, non-historical event, what is the value of time and history? 163  
Third, if the resurrection takes place in death, and the dead body is still lying on the deathbed, 
then what is really resurrected? Is that not merely “a camouflaged return of the doctrine of 
immortality on philosophically somewhat more adventurous presuppositions.”164 
By raising those questions, Ratzinger points out that attempts to surpass the immortality 
of the soul are “quirky pathways, full of logical leaps and ruptures”165 in eschatology. He thus 
maintains the necessity of the doctrine of the immortality of the soul within the traditional two-
phase eschatology. He also tries to re-appropriate the doctrine by investigating biblical data 
concerning it. 
3. Biblical Data: Immortality of the Soul as Communion with God through Christ 
Analyzing biblical data, Ratzinger discovers the theological and Christological character 
of the Christian understanding of the immortality. Two texts attracted his attention. The first is 
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God’s revelation to Moses at the burning bush: “I am the God of Abraham…” (Ex. 3:6). 
Reflecting on the texts in the light of Matt. 22:32, Ratzinger makes a remarkable assertion: 
"Those who are called by God are part of the concept of God.” Because God is Life, immortal, 
then communion with God is the root of life indestructible.166 The second text is John 11:25f.: “I 
am the resurrection and the life. Those who believe in me, even though they die, will live, and 
anyone who lives and believes in me will never die” (NRSV). Observing that text, Ratzinger 
holds that the theological concept of immortality has taken on a Christological character. The 
communion with Christ is the source of resurrection and eternal life even here and now, while 
death is overcome.167 From those insights, Ratzinger concludes that the Christian understanding 
of the immortality is placed “not on a particular anthropology, whether anti-Platonic or Platonic, 
but on a theology.”168 It begins with the concept of God and takes on a Christological focus.169  
The above somewhat “existential” immortality in Johannine tradition, however, does not 
rule out the question of what we call “the intermediate state.” In the Scripture, the life of the dead 
has been a concern since primitive Judaism until St. Paul’s time. Retrieving biblical data, 
Ratzinger discovers several concepts relating to the afterlife: the dead’s existence in Sheol, the 
punishment in Gehenna, the reward in the bosom of Abraham or paradise, etc.170 Ratzinger’s 
discovery resembles that of Pozo, mentioned in the previous chapter. What attracts Ratzinger 
most are the NT expressions of the dead’s enduring relationship with Christ, found in Luke’s 
Gospel, the Acts of the Apostles, and some Pauline letters: “You will be with me in paradise,” 
“Lord Jesus, receive my spirit, “whether we wake or sleep, we might live with him,” “the dead in 
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Christ.”171 Those expressions once again reveal the relational and Christological character in the 
biblical understanding of immortality.  
For Ratzinger, the relationship with God through Christ becomes the lens through which 
later Church documents about the immortality of the soul are to be assessed. With that biblical 
lens, Ratzinger makes assessments of two Church documents. The first is Pope Benedict XII’s 
constitution Benedictus Deus (1336). As he observes, that document maintains the relational 
character in talking about the beatific vision granted to the souls of the blessed, while the 
Christological character can only be inferred by “christologizing.”172 Meanwhile, Lateran V’s 
Apostolici regiminis (1513) is “an instructive text,” a warning against the Aristotelianism of 
Pietro Pomponazzi (1464-1525). The decree states that one cannot say the spiritual soul is a 
mortal, non-individual, impersonal, or that it is a collective reality all individuals participate.173 
In other words, the document warns against a misunderstanding of the Christian concept of soul 
with either the Aristotle’s anima forma corporis or the universal nous. 
In short, biblical data reveals the theological-Christological character of the Christian 
understanding of the immortality. The relationship with God through Christ constitutes a 
person’s immortality, in this life and beyond death. This is a fundamental eschatological belief in 
early Christianity, and it requires a compatible anthropological expression. In the time-
consuming construction of such a compatible theological anthropology, Hellenistic philosophy 
offers the most important conceptual tools.   
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4. Christian Theology: “A New Concept of Soul” and “Dialogical Immortality” 
It is not easy to assess the significant contribution of Hellenistic philosophy to the 
development of the Christian concept of soul. Because of that significant contribution, Christian 
anthropology and eschatology are sometimes misunderstood as Hellenistic or Platonic. However, 
a thorough investigation of both the ancient Greek philosophy and the development of Christian 
doctrine reveals a subtle distinction between them.  
Delving into the ancient Greek philosophy, Ratzinger discovers diverse views on 
anthropology and no clear and consistent vision of eschatology. In Homer’s world, the body and 
person coincide. Then appeared the Orphic religion, which suggests the possible separation of 
the soul and the body, and the latter is the prison of the former. The soul in that religion is 
considered the locus of knowledge, judgment, and purification. Later, Plato used that concept of 
soul mostly to emphasize “the inner unity in man,” not a separation of elements.174 But after all, 
Plato does not develop a unified philosophy of the soul’s nature or its relation to the body. He 
also takes the religious idea of the soul’s immortality as a philosophical starting point. With 
Aristotle, the soul is the form of the body, and it dies with the body; the truly spiritual element of 
a person is nous (mind/intellect) – an impersonal element connecting a person with the divine 
and transcendent principle. Thus, in Aristotle’s vision, there is both a soul-body unity and a 
dualism because of the nous. Later, Plotinus synthesized ancient Greek philosophy into a kind of 
trinity: the One, nous, and soul. If the soul goes down along cosmic processes, it multiplies in the 
mirrors of matter. If the soul goes up to the One through nous, it is united to the divine origin, in 
which individuality just disappears. In short, ancient Greek philosophy presents diverse 
anthropologies. A careful analysis of those views leads Ratzinger to the conclusion: “The 
 






frequently encountered notion of Hellenistic-Platonic dualism of soul and body, with its 
corollary in the idea of the soul’s immortality, is something of the theologians’ fantasy.”175 
Meanwhile, ancient Greek philosophy offers no consistent vision regarding eschatology. It 
suggests either no afterlife, some vague hint of immortality, or the mythopoetic shadowy 
existence in Hades.176 
The early Christian Church, meanwhile, believed in the immortality of the soul on the 
basis of the Jewish tradition (the life of the dead in Sheol) and the NT’s Christological focus 
(being with Christ, from this life unto the afterlife). That eschatological belief demanded an 
anthropological expression. However, a compatible anthropology was not worked out clearly and 
consistently due to the lack of a unified terminology. At first, the terms “soul” or “spirit,” 
understood as “the being of the human person that survives death,” and “the bearer of the 
existence with Christ,” were used.177 However, such terms were soon obscured by Gnosticism, 
which contrasted psyche (the lowest rung of human existence) with pneuma (the more elevated 
condition) and with the body. Hence, to keep using the terms, the Church needed to clarify and 
incorporate them into an anthropology compatible with all biblical data. An anthropology of that 
sort, according to Ratzinger, must recognize two things. First, the human is a creature with 
“unified totality,” “conceived and willed by God.” Second, it must distinguish in the human “an 
element that perishes and an element that abides.”178 Philosophically, it must merge Plato and 
Aristotle’s visions at their points of contradiction: the soul must be “united to the body” and, at 
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the same time, “must not be entirely dependent on the body for what it is.” That was an inherent 
difficulty, and it took the Church centuries to offer a synthesis.179   
The Christian anthropology, Ratzinger claims, was finally found in the work of St. 
Thomas Aquinas. On the one hand, Thomas followed Aristotle’s doctrine of anima forma 
corporis; on the other hand, he broke away from Aristotle in maintaining the spiritual and 
personal nature of the soul.180 As a form, the soul is one with the body; it belongs to the world of 
bodies marked by becoming and passing away. As a spirit, the soul abides and grows in maturity 
toward eternity, even in the corruption of the body. For Ratzinger, Thomas’ “dual character” of 
the soul is a powerful idea, a novelty in Christian philosophy and theology. He writes: 
The soul belongs to the body as ‘form,’ but that which is the form of the body is still 
spirit. It makes man a person and opens him to immortality. Compared with all the 
conceptions of the soul available in antiquity [Hellenism], this notion of the soul is quite 
novel. It is a product of Christian faith, and of the exigencies of faith for human 
thought.181 
The above concept of soul is unique compared with that of both Plato and Aristotle. 
However, that concept also gives rise to one question: Does the soul as spirit possess immortality 
as an essential characteristic? Ratzinger answers in the negative. For him, belief in 
substantialistic immortality is “theologically inappropriate” in Christianity. It may be “circulated 
in popular thinking,” but “not among great theological teachers.”182 Gregory of Nyssa and 
Thomas are iconic examples. For Gregory, Christian tradition believes that immortality consists 
in knowing and seeing God, as the Beatitudes state. The problem is that humans, though they 
want to see God, do not have the strength to do so without dying. It is a dilemma, just like St. 
Peter, who wants to walk on the waters of mortality to taste immortality but quickly sinks. Only 
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the Lord can save Peter from sinking and set him straight on the waves. That account illustrates 
the dialogical character of immortality: a desire on the human’s part, and a gift granted by the 
divine, who alone possesses or, more precisely, is immortality. Centuries after Gregory of Nyssa, 
Thomas uses another way to express the dialogical character of immortality when he envisions 
all creation as coming from God and returning to God as its Source.183 With those witnesses, 
Ratzinger shows how Christianity does not consider immortality part of the soul’s nature, but a 
gift of God, given in the context of the divine-human dialogue.  
A new question arising from the above concept of immortality is the fate of humanity at 
large. If immortality is given within the divine-human dialogue, which has taken on 
Christological character, will it be a special grace only for Christians or a small number of the 
devout? Ratzinger’s answer is “no.” Indeed, he identifies God with “truth in its most 
comprehensive meaning,” the “Ground” of all beings, or “Another.” Ratzinger also notes that 
opening to truth, relating to the Ground or Another, is not “some optional pleasurable diversion 
for the intellect,” but something that lies in “the core of the human’s very essence.”184 Such 
openness and relatedness in freedom make the human immortal. Following Thomas, Ratzinger 
notes that the capacity for openness or relatedness is not a merely human achievement. It is given 
to humans as their possession in creation, understood as God’s self-communication to 
creatures.185 In a sense, it can be seen as part of human nature, given that such a nature is already 
graced by God.  
What would happen if someone goes against his/her nature? If he/she closes off rather 
than remains open to the rest of beings, and thus to God? For Ratzinger, that closing off would 
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be like “Sheol-existence,” an existence without relation.186 It is sin. Sin does not result in “sheer 
nothingness” or “the annulment of being”; instead, it creates a “self-contradiction, a self-negating 
possibility, namely ‘Sheol.’”187 Fortunately, God’s gracious power overcomes that self-
contradiction from within. In Christ’s incarnation and death, God “descends into the pit of 
Sheol” and creates in Sheol the possibility of a relationship, of a dialogue.188 Christ’s incarnation 
and descent into Sheol once more show the gratuity of immortality: it is not a human 
achievement, but a gift from God.  
5. Summary and Discussion 
Ratzinger presents a thorough study of the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. 
Beginning with the dispute between immortality and resurrection, he returns to biblical data and 
history of doctrine, to discover what remains hidden or presupposed in the Scripture and tradition 
and has meaning for contemporary Christian life. The result is a fresh interpretation of the 
immortality of the soul, with three central conclusions. First, human beings do not possess 
substantialistic immortality but are given immortality in their dialogue with God through Christ. 
Second, early Christian belief in the human’s indestructible relationship with God through Christ 
demands “an anthropological constant,” which is found in Thomas’ concept soul as both the 
form of the body and spirit. Third, the dialogue with God through Christ is mediated by truth and 
love of others; consequently, opening to truth and fellowship with others are concrete 
expressions of the dialogical immortality.  
Ratzinger’s discussion of the immortality of the soul is brilliant. It successful synthesizes 
different elements of Christian faith and life, such as God-Christ-self-others, this life-the 
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afterlife. On the pathway to that synthesis, Ratzinger also clarifies some controversial issues 
regarding the doctrine in question. With critical acuity, he maintains the necessity of the 
doctrine, as theologians can hardly explain the issue of identity and change without it. With 
clarity, he highlights the Hebraic origin of the doctrine, the uniqueness of Christian concepts of 
soul and immortality, without repudiating the significance of conceptual tools offered by Greek 
philosophy. An appreciation of distinctive contributions of different traditions within the doctrine 
is a hallmark in Ratzinger’s work.     
Despite the above contributions, Ratzinger has to deal with a twofold difficulty regarding 
the soul in the intermediate state: the anima separata and the state of the corpse. Strictly 
speaking, this is the difficulty facing Thomas, and those who adopt his concept of anima forma 
corporis. In Thomas’ philosophy, matter without form is materia prima. Therefore, when the 
soul as the only form of the body departs, two things happen. First, the soul is no longer the form 
of the body, but an anima separata. Second, the body is no longer a human body, but a corpse, 
and “between a living body and a corpse lies the chasm of prime matter.”189 When the soul 
departs, new forms take the place the soul once held. Thus, Thomas cannot guarantee the self-
identity of the body before and after death. A good point in Thomas’ theory is that any matter 
can be taken up for the resurrected body. However, the same theory also raises question about 
the state of corpses, and hence questions about the veneration of dead bodies and relics in the 
Church.190  
Ratzinger is aware of the difficulty facing Thomistic hylomorphism. He points it out and 
makes a suggestion. As he notes, there is an “abiding ordination of the soul to matter,” and “the 
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soul cannot completely leave behind its relationship with matter.”191 Those statements echo 
Thomas’ thought, that the soul’s departure from the body is “contrary to its nature and per 
accidens”; hence, the soul longs for its reunion with the body.192 As John Gavin notes, Ratzinger 
does not think of this longing as a mere tendency, but “an intimate connection” between the soul 
and matter.193 The question is: what is precisely the matter to which the soul is ordained or with 
which it has intimate connection? Is it the matter the soul used to draw into its corporeal 
expression, namely its dead body? Or is it matter in general, the cosmos? Can it be a third kind 
of matter, another body, and hence reincarnation? Ratzinger does not elaborate on those 
questions. Rather, he shifts to treat the issue of anima separata in another way. In his 
Introduction to Christianity, he believes that the issue of anima separata has become obsolete by 
the doctrine of the “communion of saints.”194 Later, in the preface to the second edition of 
Eschatology: Death and Eternal Life (2006), he makes recourse to the body of Christ, saying: 
“Beginning with our baptism, we belong to the body of the resurrected one… Never again are we 
totally disembodied.”195 In a sense, being in the communion of saints and part of Christ’s body 
means not being disembodied. Nevertheless, the original problem of anima separata (the soul 
being separated from its body), the state of the dead body, and the possible relation of the soul to 
matter after death, etc., are still open for further thought and discussion. 
Another issue concerning Ratzinger’s vision is “time” “after” death. Razinger rejects the 
idea of the dead stepping out of time right into eternity or timelessness, because “eternity with a 
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beginning is no eternity at all.”196 He also disagrees with G. Lohfink’s retrieval of the concept of 
aevum, because aevum is the mode of time of angels, and a dead human does not become an 
angel.197 Ratzinger then suggests memoria-time as the temporality of the dead.198 For him, in 
memoria-time “lies the reason for the definitiveness of what we have done…, the possibility of a 
purification and fulfilment in a final destiny.”199 This suggestion is very interesting, except for 
one little problem: memoria-time is internal and subject to the mind of each individual. How can 
it be shared by the departed, who are supposed to be in communion with others, both living and 
dead, and with Christ? This is a question still hard to answer, which calls for further reflections. 
In short, Ratzinger provides a unique thought on the immortality of the soul, particularly 
through his discussion of the Thomistic concept of soul and dialogical immortality. The concept 
of soul as form and spirit preserves personal identity through change and death. Dialogical 
immortality emphasizes the significance of the relationship with God through Christ, the value of 
truth and love in human destiny. However, Ratzinger’s adoption of the Thomistic concept of soul 
also lead him to the questions facing Thomism – the anima separata and the temporality of the 
dead. Though Ratzinger offers his answers, namely the communion of saints in the body of 
Christ and memoria-time, such answers in their turns lead to further questions. Further thought 
and discussion are still needed for a breakthrough. 
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Karl Rahner, a prominent Catholic theologian, also offers his thoughts about the anima 
separata and time of the dead. His thoughts are somewhat different from those of Ratzinger, 
though both of them accept the Thomistic concept of soul as form of the body and emphasize the 
Christological character of immortality. How can they be different from each other? The answer 
rests on Rahner’s understanding of the unity of the human person. A grasp of Rahner’s insights 
on those topics will help us better understand contemporary Catholic eschatology, at least in 
regard to the immortality of the soul. 
II. Karl Rahner on the Immortality of the Soul 
 While Ratzinger dedicates a large part of his “most thorough work”200 to discuss the 
immortality of the soul biblically, historically, and systematically, Rahner surprisingly does not 
write any article on that doctrine. He only occasionally touches upon it in Theological 
Investigations (TI). Thus, we can only know what Rahner thinks about the immortality of the 
soul through a construction. The starting point is his anthropology, from which we can see what 
Rahner thinks about the soul, and what he means by the immortality of the soul. Other related 
themes, such as the life of the dead and the pancosmicity of the soul after death, will help us 
grasp more fully Rahner’s breadth and depth in a part of his eschatology.   
1. Rahner’s Anthropology: Unity in Distinction 
 Rahner strongly emphasizes the unity and wholeness of the human person. In several 
articles relating to anthropology, he stresses the unity in distinction in human composition, 
particularly between spirit and matter, soul and body. 
 






  In “The Unity of Spirit and Matter in the Christian Understanding of Faith,” Rahner 
warns against “a world-wide materialism”201 and “a spiritualizing Platonism”202 that undermine 
the proper Christian understanding of human beings. With cautions, Rahner presents the 
ontological unity of spirit and matter. As he argues, the Christian faith recognizes the unity of 
spirit and matter by their origin, in their history, and their final end. First, both spirit and matter 
have one and the same origin – the infinite and absolute reality we call God. Second, spirit and 
matter are united in history. They mutually correlate, to the extent that one conditions the other 
and vice versa. The mutual correlation and conditioning are exhibited clearly in the process of 
evolution. In that process, matter, by God’s power, gives rise to human spirit through active self-
transcendence.203 In return, the human spirit draws matter into its process of becoming by 
entering into and by keeping matter as a factor of its own becoming. Thus, matter is not alien to 
but “a moment of the spirit.”204 For that reason, the history of nature and history of spirit are one 
and the same history.205 Third, spirit and matter are united in their achievement and goal. In the 
Christian faith, matter is not provisional, to be discarded at the end of time. Instead, both spirit 
and matter “remain eternally valid before God and form forever, now and in the state of 
perfection, the mutually correlative, non-separable constitutive elements of the one created 
reality.”206 
Rahner favors speaking about the human as spirit;207 however, he sometimes treats in 
detail the unity in distinction between the soul and body. In “Theology of the Symbol,” he 
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follows Thomas in holding that “the soul is the form of the body.”208 Meanwhile, the body is 
nothing other than the “self-expression,” the “real symbol” of the soul. It is “the actuality of the 
soul itself through the ‘other’ of materia prima.” As Rahner explains, the soul “produces” the 
body with prima materia, while the body renders the soul present in space and time.209 Soul and 
body for Rahner are just two sides of the same coin. From those conceptions, a strict soul and 
body unity can be guaranteed, while their distinction can be maintained.  
Rahner also mentions the unity in distinction between soul and body in “The Body in the 
Order of Salvation.” In that article, he justifies the distinction made in the Church tradition. For 
Rahner, the reproach of Greek philosophy as a distortion of biblical anthropology and corruption 
of the original biblical message is “certainly an exaggeration.”210 Though the OT never really 
distinguished between the body and soul in the philosophical sense, it does not mean there is no 
philosophical distinction. Thus, the distinction made or assumed in Church teachings (e.g., the 
Councils of Vienna and Lateran V) is “undoubtedly legitimate,” “theologically correct,” and 
“completely justifiable.”211 However, Rahner also states that such a distinction is only 
“metaphysical and meta-existential.” In reality, we never encounter a mere body or a mere soul, 
but always a human person, “an incarnate spirit.” Because of the “indivisible unity” in the human 
person, “an existential cleavage between the body and the soul is actually impossible.”212 Rahner 
believes that the unity in the human person is “designed by God,” and no one can break it. A 
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person, for example, may be aware of the bodily and spiritual elements within him/herself, but 
he/she can never “get behind this unity, to take sides purely with the spirit or with the body.”213  
In brief, Rahner emphasizes the ontological unity of the human person. In him/her, spirit 
and matter, soul and body cannot be separated. The distinction is justifiable philosophically or 
theologically. But existentially, a separation is impossible, even by the person him/herself.  
The unity in distinction between spirit and matter, soul and body, is only one part of 
Rahner’s anthropology. Indeed, Rahner also portrays the human person with other 
characteristics: an individual and social being; living in solidarity with the cosmos and openness 
to the transcendent; having freedom for definitive self-determination and responsibility; being 
threatened by guilt and subject to God’s forgiving self-communication.214 All those factors 
constitute what it means to be human. It is in the last characteristic – being subject to God’s 
forgiving self-communication – that the soul’s immortality can be understood.  
2. A Rahnerian Vision of the Immortality of the Soul 
Though Rahner asserts that the immortality of the soul is “a truth of faith and not a 
philosophical tenet,”215 he does not directly treat the doctrine. We can only know what he thinks 
about it with a construction. Following Mark Fischer,216 I think three steps below are helpful for 
a construction of a Rahnerian vision of the immortality of the soul.  
First, for Rahner, the soul is the form of the body. The soul “actualizes” the potency of 
matter, and “causes” it to take a particular form. This process of actualization presupposes 
time/history and purposefulness, toward the perfection of the matter informed by the soul.217 
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Second, in the Christian tradition, the soul is the “immediate work” of God (cf. DH 360). 
Pope Pius XII in Humanae generis in 1950 reaffirmed the doctrine of God’s immediate creation 
of the soul. Rahner recognizes Pius XII’s reaffirmation and understands the doctrine 
metaphysically. As Rahner explains in “Natural Science and Reasonable Faith,” God creates the 
world not in a single act of creation, but in a constant process of “quasi-formal causality.”218 The 
creation of human souls can be identified with this continuous creative process.219  
Third, following St. Thomas, Rahner believes that Word of God assumed flesh through 
the soul, understood as the seat of human nature.220 For Rahner, the Word’s assumption of flesh 
is not a mere disguise to set right things on earth, and then return to heaven.221 Instead, the 
assumption is first of all an act of creation, because God “creates the human reality by the very 
fact that he assumes it as his own.”222 Second, the assumption is an act of God’s self-gift to the 
human, when the Word “empties himself, gives away himself, poses the other as his own 
reality.”223 Through the Word, God establishes human reality as God’s own reality. Human 
reality becomes immortal because of being assumed by the Word. 
According to Mark Fischer, the Rahner believes that “the Word dwelt not just among us, 
but within us,” and that indwelling is “the more profound meaning” of the doctrine of the 
incarnation that Rahner proposed.224 When the Word enters human nature, that nature, the very 
human soul, become immortal. For Rahner, the soul does not lack immortality prior to the 
 
218 Rahner, “Natural Science and Reasonable Faith,” 35f. Rahner tries to maintain that God is not the formal cause of 
the cosmos, lest Christianity becomes pantheism. He does not think of God as the mere efficient cause so that God 
and the cosmos exist side by side. Rather, through “quasi-formal” causality, God is in the world as its transcendental 
Ground. 
219 Rahner, “Natural Science and Reasonable Faith,” 44f.;  
220 Fischer, “Karl Rahner and the Immortality of the Soul,” 9. 
221 Rahner, “On the Theology of the Incarnation,” TI 4:105-120 (111f.).  
222 Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, 222. Rahner draws on Augustine, who thinks that God “creates by 
assuming” and “assumes by creating.”  
223 Rahner, “On the Theology of the Incarnation,” 114f. 






incarnation of the Word in Jesus Christ, because the Word was present in God’s creative acts, in 
the gift of Decalogues, in the prophetic teachings, and especially in the voice of conscience. The 
soul becomes immortal when it hears and obeys the Word in those ways.225 He writes: 
[T]he soul is immortal because God created it with the capacity to receive God’s Word. 
Throughout history, that Word has addressed human beings via the conscience. Then, at a 
specific moment in history, the divine Word emptied itself, assumed a human soul, and 
made that soul its dwelling place. In that act, God revealed the divine intention for us. 
God intended an intimate relationship between divinity and humanity, a relationship by 
which God would freely offer us a share in the divine life. Our proper response is to 
discern the Word, to accept its message, and to act upon it. When we do, even when it 
costs us our lives, God validates that choice, recognizing its permanence, and 
incorporates it into God’s own history. That was the testimony of Jesus Christ. Because 
God raised him from the dead, we, his brothers and sisters, can hope that God will raise 
us as well.226  
In short, when the Word of God assumes the human soul, the soul becomes the abode of 
the living Word and is given a share of the Word’s immortality. That is the vision of immortality 
proposed in Rahner’s theology of the incarnation. In a sense, Rahner’s vision is quite similar to 
that of Ratzinger, as they both emphasize the Christological character of immortality. Both 
visions are existential in the sense that the communion with God through Christ is a matter of 
here and now. Both visions call for faith as the acceptance of God’s self-communication, and for 
a righteous and truthful life in fellowship and love of neighbors.  
But immortality is not limited to present life. It expands beyond death. Then, what would 
happen to the soul? With this question, we have to get back to the unavoidable difficulties of 
anima separata and time of the dead, inherent in Thomistic metaphysics to which both Ratzinger 
and Rahner adhere. In response to those difficulties, Rahner proposes two hypotheses - the 
pancosmicity of the soul and eternity in and from time.  
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3. The Pancosmicity of the Soul 
Rahner proposes the hypothesis of the pancosmicity of the soul in a booklet titled On the 
Theology of Death (1961). The basic idea of pancosmicity of the soul originates from Rahner’s 
emphasis on the substantial unity of the human person. Because of that unity, death strikes the 
whole person, not merely the body.227 In traditional theology, particularly in the Catechism of the 
Catholic Church (no. 997), death is described as the separation of soul and body. For Rahner, 
that description is both truthful and inadequate. It is truthful in pointing out that “the soul 
assumes in death… a new and different relation to that which is usually called the body.” 
Because in death, the soul no longer holds the structure of the body, and the body lives no more, 
Rahner thinks that “we can and must say that the soul separates from the body.”228 However, in 
traditional description of death, the term “separation” seems obscure and can be subject to 
different interpretations. The problem, Rahner thinks, consists in the conception of the body. He 
explains: during a lifetime, the soul is one with the body, and the body is part of the material 
universe, so the soul must have a relation to the material universe. At death, if the soul is 
“separated” from the body, does it become a-cosmic? Or, because no longer be limited to an 
individual body, the soul has a more intimate relationship to the world, and becomes pancosmic?  
Pondering on those questions, especially in the light of Christology, Rahner poses the 
hypothesis that death does not make the soul a-cosmic. Instead, as the soul in death is no longer 
bound to an individual bodily structure, it “enters into a much closer, more intimate relationship 
to the universe as a whole.”229 By the pancosmicity of the soul, Rahner does not mean that a 
particular soul becomes at death the form of the cosmos, or that the soul becomes omnipresent to 
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the whole world.230 Rather, he tries to maintain his vision that an animated body is “an open 
system,” which does not stop “where our skin stops.”231 Similarly, an embodied soul is not a 
closed monad, but exists in communication with the world. Such openness to and 
communication with the world may be maintained and even expanded at death, when the soul is 
not limited to a specific point in space and time.  
How can we justify the soul’s connection to the material world after death? To this 
question, Rahner provides both philosophical and theological justifications. Philosophically, he 
makes three arguments. First, in Thomistic philosophy, informing the body is “the substantial 
act” of the soul, an act “not really distinct from the existence soul.”232 Thus, if the soul 
“survives,” it cannot be what it is unless it somehow continues to inform the body; thus the soul 
after death must have some sort of connection to the material world. Second, on the basis of 
“life-entelechy” (vital force) theory, which suggests that sub-human organisms die but their 
“entelechical powers remain solidly implanted in the universe,”233 Rahner thinks that the soul – 
the entelechy or vital force of human being – also persists in the world after death. Third, certain 
parapsychological phenomena might be more easily explained of the soul after death still has 
some connection with the world.234 Though Rahner does not give any specific example, one can 
think of some “alleged communications with the dead” through mediums during seances.235  
Theologically, Rahner also offers three arguments for the pancosmicity of the soul after 
death. First, angels are considered pure spirits, but they still have relationship to material world. 
Second, the teachings about the communion of saints and purgatory presuppose the relation 
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between the souls and material beings. Third, the resurrection of the body is more intelligible if 
the soul is connected to the world rather than cut off.236 The resurrected body of Christ, corporeal 
and spiritual, inner-worldly and transcendent, is for Rahner “the perfect expression of the 
enduring relation of the glorified person to the world as a whole.”237 
In brief, Rahner’s hypothesis of the pancosmicity of the soul aims at preserving the 
substantial unity of the human person. In a certain sense, it is a critique of the traditional 
understanding of death as the separation of body and soul, and an answer to the question of 
anima separata inherent in Thomistic metaphysics. Though Rahner in his later writings does not 
mention this hypothesis, Peter Phan thinks that “his basic ideas concerning the relationship of the 
soul to matter after death remains unchanged.”238 Phan’s observation seems correct, as Rahner 
somehow maintains his idea about the relationship between the soul and matter after death in the 
an interview in the last years of his life.239 
Rahner’s interpretation of death and the pancosmicity of the soul is not without questions. 
Phan in his Eternity in Time raised a series of them: has Rahner done justice to the notion of 
death as the separation of the soul from body? Has he missed the point that death is a real 
destruction of the substantial unity of the human being? Are philosophical and theological 
arguments for the pancosmicity of the soul truly persuasive? Are there other solutions to the 
problems of the relationship between matter and the soul after death?240 To some extent, Rahner 
answered such questions in some interviews in the last years of his life. Indeed, he thought of 
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death not so much as the consequence of sin, but as “the eternal fulfillment.”241 He also thinks 
that “a relation of matter to the soul after death would be quite conceivable.”242 But Rahner also 
admits that “we do not have answers for everything,” especially about the beyond. He thus 
advises us to “entrust ourselves in hope and love to the incomprehensibility of God.”243  
4. Eternity in and from Time  
Regarding the temporality of the dead, Rahner suggests “eternity.” He makes this 
suggestion in two articles – “The Life of the Dead” (1959) and “Eternity from Time” (1979). 
In the first article, Rahner suggests that care must be taken when speaking about “the life 
of the dead” in order not to leave the impression that “things go on” after death. For him, there is 
no afterlife in the sense of “rectilinear continuation of man’s empirical reality,” no change of 
horse to continue riding, no vagueness of temporal existence. He writes: “No, in this regard death 
puts an end to the whole man.”244 For Rahner, the end of the whole person in terms of 
temporality is the dawn of “a new manner of existence” – eternity. The question is: what does 
Rahner mean by eternity? 
Rahner’s concept of eternity is closely connected with time and human freedom. In his 
thought, time is finite; it has a “beginning,” it runs its irreversible course toward its end. Time is 
important, as it is “the condition of possibility for the exercise of human freedom.”245 In time, a 
person makes choices and ultimately decides what he/she will become out of freedom. Thus, 
freedom is not the capacity to make an indefinite number of choices, but the capacity for finality 
and definitiveness of the whole person. And whenever a person achieves finality and 
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definitiveness in time, either by particular acts of freedom, or by the last act of freedom, namely 
death, then eternity comes to be.246 Rahner writes: 
It is in time, as its own mature fruit, that ‘eternity’ comes about. It does not come ‘after’ 
the time we experience, in order to prolong time: it eliminates time by being released 
from the time that was for a while, so that the definitive could come about in freedom. 
Eternity is not an immeasurably long-lasting mode of pure time, but a mode of the spirit 
and freedom which are fulfilled in time, and hence can only be comprehended in the light 
of a correct understanding of spirit and freedom.247  
In brief, eternity is the fulfilled mode of human spirit/freedom. Eternity is not outside, above, 
after, beyond time, but “created” in time and from time. It is time having acquired final and 
definitive validity before God through the exercise of freedom.248 
How do we know that eternity happens in time? To this question, Rahner makes recourse 
to human knowledge and revelation. As for human knowledge, he mentions great, “inexhaustible 
and indestructible” love, “incorruptible truth and honesty,” “true moral goodness,” “the absolute 
value of moral decision,” “the now and forever validity” of spiritual reality. All those realities 
transcend time, and mediate the presence of something eternal.249 But if a person is still doubtful 
that time will dissolve all that is valid in life, then only God’s Word can tell and reveal to 
him/her the actuality of eternity in the middle of time. Rahner writes: 
…[E]ternity as the fruit of time means to come before God either to reach pure 
immediacy and closeness to him face to face in the absolute decision of love for him, or 
to be enveloped in the burning darkness of eternal god-lessness in the definitive closing 
of one’s heart against him…. Since God knows each man[woman] by name, since 
everyone exists in time before the God who is judgement and salvation, everyone is a 
man[woman] of eternity, not just the enlightened spirits of human history. The theology 
of St. John makes it clear that the existence of eternity is seen as inserted in time, and that 
hence eternity grows out of time and is not just the afterthought of a reward appended to 
time.250 
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In a sense, eternity can be experienced as the transcendental aspect of time, and eschatology, the 
transcendental aspect of our present. Classical theology suggests that only after death, the soul 
will come before God to be judged, to be punished or rewarded, and wait for the resurrection of 
the body, and then eternal life of the human whole begins. Rahner, in the light of Johannine 
Gospel, suggests the eschatological aspect of the here and now. For him, it is right in time that 
we humans are standing before God, to be judged by God, and to receive our eternal reward or 
damnation, both soul and body. This vision discloses the unfathomable depth and richness of our 
life, however trivial and banal it may appear.  
Later, in “Eternity from Time,” Rahner continues to maintain this vision. He suggests 
three hints of eternity in and from time within our experience. First, we have experiences in 
which changing phenomena are manifestations of something permanent, which “persists as the 
same reality, sustaining the changing appearances, brings them together into a totality, into a 
history.”251 The history of a flower or of our own lives can be examples. Second, eternity is 
experienced mentally, when we gather past, present, and future together, binding them into a 
unity and shape. Such experience, as Rahner notes, has “a peculiar superiority over time.” It is 
“an event intimating eternity.”252 Third, eternity is experienced when we make a free decision 
that concerns the whole person. In that decision, when self-disposal is irrevocable, something 
definitive is achieved in time. “Here, time really creates eternity and eternity is experienced in 
time.”253  
 What about the eternity that we, Christians, hope to reach as our definitive life beyond 
death? To this question, Rahner admits his ignorance:  
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[W]e cannot positively imagine here the concreteness of our eternal life. We know, it is 
true, that it will be an existence and life that has God himself in himself as its content, a 
life that implies love, limitless knowledge, supreme happiness, and so on. But how all 
this can be experienced in the concreteness of a state beyond time, what is the meaning of 
transfigured corporeality, eternal fellowship with the redeemed, and so on: this is 
something that we cannot concretely imagine or picture to ourselves here and now.254  
 In short, for Rahner, eternity is the definitive state of the moral and free act of our life 
taken as a whole. In a lifetime, we make ourselves the person we will be in eternity. This vision 
reveals the grandeur of our everyday actions, even though they seem mediocre. In the light of the 
Christian proclamation, Rahner makes two consoling conclusions. First, if our everyday life “is 
lived in faith, hope, and love,” then “eternity truly occurs…, since it has received God himself.” 
Second, though “timeless definitive perdition” is a possibility, it is not equal to salvation, 
because of “the victory of the love of God, who bestows himself in and through our freedom.” 
God’s love causes and guarantees that our brief, passing time creates “an eternity not made up 
out of time.” But that “eternity, born from time, is something other than what can readily be seen 
here and now.”255 
A couple of remarks can be made here regarding Rahner’s thought of eternity in time. On 
the one hand, such thought is fascinating. It highlights the value of human freedom as well as the 
working of God’s grace within that freedom. It reveals the transcendental aspect of our everyday 
lives and connects our humble lives to our eternal destiny with God. In a sense, it encourages us 
to commit ourselves to a life of faith, hope, and love through which we taste in advance eternal 
life, which is still unfolding. On the other hand, Rahner’s connection of eternity in time with 
freedom also gives rise to some questions: How should we conceive of God’s eternity and its 
connection with time? How about those who die prematurely, before they can exercise freedom? 
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How about lives not clearly “black or white,” but “gray” at death? Those questions are not easy 
to answer, and it may also call for our further thoughts.  
5. Summary, Comparison, and Conclusion 
Rahner’s reflections on eschatology are rich, intensive, and well connected with other 
parts of his eschatology and theology.256 A discussion of his thought on the immortality of the 
soul apart from other themes seems inadequate. However, given the limit of this chapter, it may 
be sufficient to have a summary of what Rahner thinks of the subject matter. A comparison 
between Rahner and Ratzinger’s thoughts will help us see their convergence and divergence and 
make some preliminary conclusions regarding contemporary Catholic understanding of the soul 
and its immortality. 
Rahner’s thought on the immortality of the soul springs from his anthropology through 
Christology into eschatology. The human being is a unity of spirit and matter, soul and body. 
Metaphysical distinction between them can be made, but existential separation is impossible. 
Because of this indissoluble unity, both the soul and body refer to the whole person, viewed from 
different angles. The soul is immortal when it is assumed by the Word of God, when it freely 
“allows” the Word to dwell within it in the earthly life. The gift of immortality received through 
the union with the Word in life overflows definitively into eternal life through death. Beyond 
death, the soul in its eternity is not completely cut off from the cosmos; instead, it has a new 
manner of presence and a more comprehensive relation to the world at large.  
Though Rahner’s vision is quite interesting and coherent, it also elicits several questions, 
particularly in regard to the hypotheses of the pancosmicity of the soul and eternity in time. Peter 
Phan and I have raised some questions above, and such questions call for further investigations. 
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But after all, we must agree with Rahner, that we do not have answers to every question 
regarding the beyond. Why? Because “we are actually going to the unknown, the unimaginable, 
and properly speaking, know only that it is filled with the incomprehensibility of God and his 
love.” Thus, “it is sufficient to accept for ourselves now the incomprehensibility of our eternal 
life and nevertheless go on hoping and trusting.”257 
Rahner and Ratzinger share substantial similarities regarding the soul and its immortality. 
Both of them draw on Thomistic anthropology, in which the spiritual soul is the only form of the 
body. With that concept of soul, they both emphasize the unity of the human person as long as 
he/she lives on earth. In addition, both of them maintain the theological-Christological character 
in the Christian understanding of immortality. The soul does not possess a natural, 
substantialistic immortality but receives it as a gift in the community with God through the 
Word/Christ. Last but not least, both of them underline the existential character of the 
immortality through hearing and obedience to the Word, through faith in Jesus Christ, through a 
truthful and honest life in fellowship with others.  
To some extent, Rahner and Ratzinger diverge in regard to death and the afterlife. 
Ratzinger seems to accept the separation of the soul from the body, though he leaves a couple of 
hints of their possible relationship beyond death. As for time of the dead, Ratzinger does not 
accept the soul’s immediate entry into eternity and suggests memoria-time as proper for the soul 
in the intermediate state. Meanwhile, Rahner tries to maintain the unity of the human person by 
proposing the pancosmicity of the soul. He also suggests a person’s entry into eternity, created in 
and from time. In a way, Rahner seems to go further than Ratzinger in defining the state of the 
soul beyond death, though such “going further” also elicits questions. 
 






Methodologically, both Ratzinger and Rahner’s explanations are helpful for a better 
understanding of the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. Ratzinger’s account appears more 
“traditional” and can be thought of as a typical attempt of ressourcement. As we have seen, 
Ratzinger approaches the subject matter biblically and historically. He leads us back to the 
biblical sources of the doctrine, from which we can formulate for ourselves a correct 
understanding of the tradition. With Ratzinger’s approach, we can defend the doctrine as part of 
the ancient Jewish and early Christian faith, which still has significance for a renewed Christian 
life here and gives hope for the future. Meanwhile, Rahner’s thought on the same topic seems 
more “up-to-date.” It represents an attempt of aggiornamento – making Christian faith 
intelligible to modern Christians and people at large. As E. Vacek observes, Rahner often starts 
with a “somewhat narrow view” about a Christian teaching and ends up with “a more expansive, 
inclusivistic perspective.”258 Vacek’s observation is correct, because Rahner often takes 
Christian teachings as well as past interpretations of such teachings as starting points. Then, in 
the light of developments in science and philosophy, in dialogue with cultures and religions, 
Rahner offers, out of his original thinking, some fresh interpretations of doctrines. The new 
interpretations either provide answers to certain questions facing the teachings or render such 
teachings intelligible to contemporary people. Rahner does not consider his interpretations 
definitive, but a kind of “experiment.” But in such experiments, he contributes significantly to 
the development of dogmatic theology in a new, changing context.  
Through Rahner and Ratzinger’s discussions, we can make three conclusions regarding 
the contemporary Catholic understanding of the immortality of the soul. First, the Christian 
concept of soul is quite distinctive compared with that of Platonism or Aristotelianism. The soul 
 







as form is united to the body, and as spirit abides the changes or corruptions of the body. 
Similarly, the Christian concept of immortality is not so much Hellenistic, but theological and 
Christological. That immortality is not a native characteristic of the soul, but a gift given by God 
through Christ to humanity. Second, the doctrine of the immortality of the soul cannot be easily 
rejected as obsolete or irrelevant. Instead, it must be kept as an expression of a truth of faith in 
God’s abiding self-communication to humanity through the Word/Christ. That truth of faith 
needs to be purified from misunderstanding spread in popular thinking, with the help of great 
Christian teachers as well as prominent theologians. Third, the immortality of the soul is, first 
and foremost, about the present life. It springs from the community with God, with the 
Word/Christ, with truth and love of neighbors, here and now. If it is properly understood, the 
doctrine will bring new light and motive for a renewed Christian life, spiritually and ethically. 









As I mention in the introduction, this thesis is a personal attempt to re-appropriate the 
doctrine of the immortality of the soul amid confusion and uncertainty. In the first chapter, I 
present two contradictory positions concerning the doctrine – one maintained by Christian 
tradition, and the other, proposed by some nonreductive physicalist theologians. As 
demonstrated, Christian tradition has maintained the existence of the soul and its survival or 
immortality in several dogmatic documents. Catholic magisterium even emphasizes the doctrine 
in question as a truth of faith in the highest order. Meanwhile, physicalist theologians, such as N. 
Murphy and J. Green, have seriously challenged the doctrine. On the basis of biblical studies, 
theological unfolding, and scientific advancement, they suggest an abandonment of the concept 
of soul as well as the immortality of the soul, to support only the body and bodily resurrection. 
As both the Catholic and physicalist positions claim to be truly biblical, biblical criticism plays a 
crucial role in the examination of the doctrine. 
A thorough investigation into the Scripture reveals the solid foundation of the traditional 
doctrine, particularly in the Hebrew Scripture. Physicalist theologians often consider the dualistic 
concept of soul and the immortality of the soul Hellenistic philosophy, an addition to and 
distortion of the original Hebraic teaching of the body and bodily resurrection. That 
consideration is not correct. As J. Barr and J. Cooper contend, while the Hebrew Bible generally 
supports a holistic (but not monistic or physicalist) vision of the human person, it also contains 
certain texts in which nephesh, neshama or ruach only make sense if they are understood as soul 
or spirit in the dualistic sense. As A. Segal and mostly C. Pozo argue, the Hebrew Bible also 
contains texts in which the survival of the soul beyond death is implied. The existence of 






effort of conception of immortality. The development of the concept of Sheol with levels and 
retributions and the differentiation of Sheol from heaven partly laid the foundation for early 
Christian belief in the afterlife, which blossomed into the doctrine on the immortality of the soul 
and the immediate recompense after death in High Middle Ages.  
The last chapter provides a Catholic understanding of the immortality of the soul by 
making recourse to the thoughts of J. Ratzinger and K. Rahner. Both theologians accept the 
Thomistic anima forma corporis as legitimate for an understanding of the human person. Both 
recognize the immortality of the soul, not as a natural survival of bodily death, but as a gift that 
springs from the dialogue, the relationship with God through Christ. The dialogical or relational, 
theological or Christological immortality begins in the present life. Faith in God and Christ, 
openness to truth, obedience to the voice of conscience, fellowship and love of neighbors, all 
constitute the soul’s immortality here and now. But the immortality of the soul is not limited to 
the present life. It springs from this life into the afterlife through death. How would the soul be in 
the afterlife? Ratzinger and Rahner provide seemingly different answers. Ratzinger suggests the 
soul’s abiding ordination to matter, its communion with the saints in the body of Christ, and 
memoria-time as solutions, while Rahner suggests the pancosmicity of the soul and eternity 
in/from time. If we look closely, Ratzinger and Rahner’s suggestions have certain points in 
common. However, both suggestions lead to new questions and call for further thoughts.  
From the discussions above, we can conclude that the traditional doctrine of the 
immortality of the soul can be defended biblically and theologically, despite the challenges 
raised by contemporary non-reductive physicalism. This is the answer I want to find out for 






theological anthropology that needs further attention, and another issue in eschatology that seems 
very exciting for further study.  
First, regarding anthropology, Christianity has maintained the unity of the body and soul 
since its early times. It has also defined the soul as form of the body and asserted the immortality 
of the soul since High Middle Ages. In a sense, Christianity has a “quite developed” theology of 
the soul. But what is the body? What is its nature? How is the relationship between the soul and 
the body? It seems that Catholic magisterium does not provide enough definitive teaching 
regarding those issues. This lack of definitive teaching creates an imbalance. The challenge 
raised by nonreductive physicalism is a good chance for Catholic theologians and Church 
magisterium to think more about the body and strike a fair balance in theological anthropology.  
Second, regarding eschatology, Christianity has been facing two difficulties for centuries: 
the separated soul and time beyond death. Prominent theologians such as Ratzinger and Rahner 
have offered their solutions, which in turn give rise to further interesting questions. One of them 
is the relationship between the soul and matter or the cosmos after death. As Ratzinger observes, 
“the soul can never completely leave behind its relationship with matter.”259 As Rahner suggests, 
the soul after death “enters into a much closer, more intimate relationship to the universe as a 
whole.”260 Then, what is meant by this relationship? How can it be realized? What is the matter 
with which the soul has relationship, according to Ratzinger? Does this relationship have 
anything to do with “the communion of saints” and “the body of Christ?” Questions of this sort 
usually fall outside the line of inquiry taken by mainstream theology. Part of the reason is the 
presupposition that the soul after death is cut off from matter and becomes a-cosmic. But if it is 
not the case, then there will be an exciting realm for us to do research. 
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